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I . INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we draw on recent progress in the theory 
of agency problems. Our analysis casts new light on, and has 
implications for, issues such as the differences between 
small and large corporations in the determination of their 
optimal capital structure and in the differentials in the 
yield of their securities . 
As Ba1mea, Haugen and Senbet ( 1985) said: "The r ole of 
agency problems enriches finance by making it more realistic 
and exciting" ( p . 1) . In this chapter, we elaborate o n what 
is meant by agency pro blems and how they are to some extent 
resolved by market forces or by complex contractual arrange-
ments. 
Agency costs arise from conflicting interests among 
parties to the corporate firm . An agency relationship can be 
defined as a contract under which one party, the princi-
pal(s) , employs another party, the agent , t o perform a ser-
vice in which some decision making authority is delegated to 
the agent . Following the classic work by Jensen and Meckling 
( 1976 ), we assume that: 1) Both parties to the relationship 
are utility maximizers who behave according to their own 
self-interest . 2) All parties involved in the corporate 
relationship are rational and capable of forming unbiased 
expectations regarding future wealth . 3) The parties have 
conflicting interests (which can occur among the principals 
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themselves ). From these assumptions, it may be concluded that 
the agent(s) will not always act in the best interest of the 
principal(s). 
The principal can greatly reduce the divergence from his 
self-interest by offering the appropriate incentives to the 
agent, by ex post readjustment, or by controlling the beha-
vior of the agent through monitoring . In some cases, it will 
be advantageous for the agent to incur bonding costs in order 
to guarantee that his behavior will be in line with the 
interest of the principal o r that the principal will be 
compensated if the agent deviates from his expected behavior . 
According to Jensen and Heckling (1976), in most agency 
relationships both parties will spend resources on monitoring 
and bonding activities. Additionally , even if the amount of 
resources spent on these activities is o ptimal, there will be 
some divergence between the agent's decisions and the deci-
sions which would maximize the principal's welfare. The dol -
lar equivalent of the principal's welfare loss due to this 
divergence is a component of the agency costs. Jensen and 
Heckling refer to it as residual loss . The other components 
of the agency costs are, as would be expected, the monitoring 
and bonding expenditures. They reduce the value of the firm. 
The current value of expected future monitoring expenditures 
by outside security holders diminishes the value of their 
securities dollar for dollar, and they will take this into 
account when determining the maximum price they are willing 
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to pay for any given security in the firm . 
Agency problems can be limited by the capital and labor 
markets . Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1985) note the different 
ways by which agency conflicts can be costlessly neutr alized 
through the capital markets. The first such mechanism deals 
with a uniting of the ownership interests of the firm's 
stockholders and debtholders. Each of the stockholders (bond-
holders) buys a fraction of the bonds (stocks) of the firm 
equivalent.to their fractional interests in the stock 
(bonds). The second alternative involves informal reorganiza-
tion. This would succeed in limiting some agency costs 
arising from formal reorganization or bankruptcy. The third 
method refers to the issuance of side securities called 
contingent contracts. Their purpose is to guarantee that 
under certain' conditions the firm will undertake a predeter-
mined investment strategy which maximizes the total value of 
all the securities, successfully eliminating the development 
of agency costs . Also, there is the possibility of a takeover 
process that could prevent agency problems, but this mecha-
nism is many times frustrated by the free-rider problem 
(discussed by Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and by Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet , 1981b) . 
The unresolved agency problems can be further reduced by 
the issuance of complex financial contracts that try to align 
the diverse and conflicting interests of the parties. The 
agency problems may well be the "raison d'etre" of these 
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complex contractual agreements since a class of security 
holders requires additional protection against possible 
expropriation of their wealth by another class of security 
holders. 
There are many complex contracts that are capable of 
realigning. the diverse interests of the varioue classes of 
security holders, such as call provisions in corporate debt, 
executive managerial stock options, convertible debt inden-
ture provizions, pension plans, convertible securities, matu-
rity structures of debt, debt renegotiation, and leasing 
agreements. These contracts are excellent for resolving such 
agency problems as risk shifting , informational asymmetry, 
excessive managerial perquisite consumption, and forgoing 
growth opportunities. The belief that complex contracts 
originate in order to reduce agency problems can explain many 
real world contractual arrangements. The call provision, for 
example, as noted by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ( 1985), can be 
explained as a means of resolving many agency problems like 
those of informational asymmetry and risk incentives and the 
shifting to high risk, low value investments in order to 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders. Conver-
tible securities are another example. They may be used to 
reduce agency problems associated with excessive perk con-
sumption by an owner- manager . 
There are, nevertheless, residual agency problems that 
still remain unresolved through either the marketplace or 
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complex financial contracts . Thoee residual agency problems 
are the ones that are dealt with in the following chapters . 
The analysis shows that the presence of agency problems o r 
attempts to control these residual agency problems require a 
comparison of the costs and benefits of the different forms 
of required outside financing in order to obtain the optimal 
corporate financing and c apital structure . 
Miller's general equilibrium model (1977) develops a 
rationale ~or capital structure invariance, even in the pres-
ence o f differential personal income taxes . This landmark 
article has been subjected to numerous empirical tests, with 
mixed results . By incorporating costly tax avoidance and 
unresolved agency problems into the analysis, Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet (198la) generalize Miller's equilibrium model and 
obtain results that appear t o be consistent with empirical 
estimates of yield differentials between corporate and tax-
exempt bonds. Furthermore, in the Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 
equilibrium, the firm's capital structure is relevant to 
valuation, and agency costs are borne by bondholders--not 
stockholders , as previously thought (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) . These works and others have taken us some distance 
toward explaining capital structure, but as Stewart Myers 
(1984) pointed out in his 1983 AFA Presidential Address, we 
still know relatively little about capital structure . One 
aspect of our future research in this area must be to explain 
differences between large and small firm capital structures . 
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The purpose of this work is to develop a general equili-
brium model similar to the one of Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 
but which takes firm size into account as an important deter-
minant of supply and demand for corporate debt . The result-
ing equilibrium provides results that are consistent with 
observed differences in both bond yields and capital struc-
tures between large and small firms . 
To facilitate the analysis, only two firm size catego-
ries are used: large corporations, characterized by separa-
tion of ownership and control, and small corporations , 
characterized ownership control, i.e . , the presence of an 
owner-manager. Agency costs have a different impact on each 
of these groups . One important example of this differential 
impact involves the relative significance of equity agency 
costs. Equity agency costs, as noted by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), result because owner managers of firms with outside 
equity have an incentive to consume excessive non- pecuniary 
benefits since they bear only a fraction of the co5t. Outside 
equity makes an unbiased estimate of these costs and adjusts 
the offering price accordingly, resulting in agency costs. By 
contrast, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet assume equity a~ency 
costs to be negligible since , according to Fama (1980), the 
labor market disciplines managers' behavior in firms with 
diffuse ownership. Therefore, we assume that agency costs are 
insignificant for large firms but are relevant for small 
firms which are dominated by an owner-manager. Based on this 
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difference and on others related to debt agency coets, ad-
justments to the supply and demand curves for large and small 
firms are undertaken, which yield a new equilibrium in the 
corporate debt market . 
The implications of this equilibrium are : 1) The yield 
on corporate debt for small firms is higher than that for 
large firms; 2) the typical small firm employs greater finan-
cial leverage than the typical large firm; 3) optimal capital 
structures•exist for firms in each size group; 4) differen-
tial agency costs of large firms are borne by bondholders 
(consistent with Barnea , Haugen and Senbet), but for small 
firms , the agency costs are shared by debt and equity 
holders. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter Two is divided into four sections. Section A discus-
ses equity agency costs. These are mainly the result of non-
pecuniary benefits or on-the-job consumption by the manager 
with partial ownership in the firm. Section B deals with the 
problems of informational asymmetry . Informational asymmetry 
occurs when the exact nature or the firm cannot be revealed 
costlessly by the manager (agent) to debt and equity finan-
ciers (principals). In this case, management sells the secu-
rities at undervalued prices, and existing security holders 
suffer a loss that can be viewed as an agency cost. Section 
C considers the different types of debt agency costs. It is 
divided into four parts. Part one looks at stockholders' 
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incentive to adopt high risk investment projects in order to 
expropriate wealth from the bondholders. Part two views the 
stockholders' incentive to forgo profitable investment oppor-
tunities when the outstanding debt is supported by the exis-
ting assets and the option to undertake these growth opportu-
nities. Part three concentrates on the agency costs of li-
quidation . Part f our deals with bankruptcy costs. These costs 
arise when insolvency occurs and different classes of securi-
ty h o lders, dispute over their respective rights . Section D 
summarizes the findings of this chapter . 
Chapter Three is composed of two sections. Section A 
discusses the implications of Mi ller 's analysis in Part one 
and the implic ations of Barnea, Haugen a nd Senbet's ( 1981a ) 
analysis in Part two. Section B deals with the further 
introduction o f equity agency costs into the model and ef -
fects o f this fact o r on the aggregate supply curve of debt 
and on the capital structure for individual firms. 
Chapter Four is divided into four sections. Section A 
presents some of the available empirical evidence relatin~ t o 
the implicatio ns of the model presented in this thesis. It 
is subdivided into f o ur parts . Part one presents the empiri-
cal evidence related to the yield differential between tax-
able and tax-exempt securities. Part two reviews the evi -
dence pertaining t o the equity differences among large and 
small corporations. Part three deals with the differences in 
the cost of debt for large and small corporations . And Part 
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four looks at the available evidence on the relationship 
between the level o f leverage an~ firm size. A brief summary 
and conclusions of the thesis are contained in Section B. 
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II. AGENCY COST PROBLKHS AND TBK SIZK D'FKCT 
A. The Agency Cost of Outside Equity 
In this chapter, an analysis is undertaken to show the 
effect of outside (non-management) equity on agency costs. 
This is done by comparing the utility maximizing behavior of 
a manager when he owns 100% of the residual claims on the 
firm to his behavior when he sells or issues outside equity 
claims which are identical to his own. It will he shown that 
the magnitude of agency costs depends on the fraction of 
ontside equity to total equity in the case of an all equity 
financed firm, and on the fraction of outside equity to 
total value of the firm in the case of a firm financed by 
inside as well as outside equity and by debt. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in a seminal article, hav e 
shown the effect of agency costs on firm investment, capital 
structure, and o ther financial matters . They argue that when 
the manager owns 100% of the residual claims, he or she 
consumes o n the job through shirking , excessive perquisites 
("perks " ), o r incompetence, which are non-pecuniary activi-
ties. He or she will do this t o the point where the marginal 
utility generated by these activities equals an additional 
dollar of wealth after taxes usable f o r consumption or 
investment outside of the firm. In this situation, the mana-
ger pays directly for consumption on the job. In effect the 
manager faces full ex post settling up with himself as secu-
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rity holder . 
In the absence o f some form of full ex post settling up 
for deviations from the contract, the sale of equity to 
outsiders generates agency costs. These agency costs result 
from the divergence of the manager ' s interest from the inte-
rest of outside shareholders . In this situation , the manager 
has an incentive to consume mo re non-pecuniary benefits since 
he will only bear a fraction ot the cost . 
Outside shareholders can limit, but probably cannot 
eliminate , these costs through monitoring activities . An 
alternative procedure fo r limiting equity agency costs which 
c an be undertaken by the manager is to engage in bonding 
activities . It is in the owner-manager's interest t o minimize 
equity agency costs since he bears the full amount of these 
costs as wealth reduction . If it is assumed that the capital 
market is efficient and that investors are rational , they 
will be aware o f the costs associated wi th increased perk 
consumption. Investors will make unbiased estimates of these 
agency costs and will adjust the price they are willing to 
pay for the corporation's shares. The manager ends up with a 
combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits which 
place him in a lower i ndifference curve when compared to the 
situation when he is the sole owner. Thus , when a manager 
decides to carry out his financial operations through common 
stock, he suffers a welfare loss which may be called an 
agency cost. 
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If the owner-manager is simply selling his own shares, 
he will bear these costs as long as the welfare increment he 
realizes by the conversion of the shares to general purchas-
ing power is large enough to offset the costs. If, to satis-
fy the financing requirements of the set of projects availa-
ble to the firm, he has to seek outside financing, the value 
of the firm will be lower than in the case when the manager 
has enough financial resources t o wholy finance the projects . 
This reduction in firm value is termed agency costs. Even if 
the owner-manager had enough money to invest in all profit-
able projects , he may decide not to do so when he seeks an 
optimal diversified portfolio of assets. In this case, his 
fraction o f ownership in the firm will be in accordance with 
his portfo lio o bjectives . 
There is a negat ive relationship between the ownership 
fraction and the agency costs generated. The owner- manager 
will continue to issue equity as long as the investments are 
sufficiently profitable and his welfare continues to rise. 
By issuing outside e quity , the manager dec reases his owner-
ship fraction, a fac t which encourages him to change the 
composition and magnitude of the benefits he receives . This 
increases, of course, the amount of corporate resources con-
sumed by the manager on the j ob. Thus, the agency costs of 
equity increase as the fractional ownership decreases. It is 
also argued by Jensen and Mec kling (1976), that, as the 
manager ' s ownership decreases, his desire to dedic ate signi-
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ficant effort to innovating activities, such as searching out 
new creative ventures or investment opportunities, diminishes. 
It is interesting ~o note that any monitoring and bond-
ing activity reduces the value of the firm dollar for dollar, 
and the minority stockholders will take this into account 
when determinig the maximum price to pay for a fraction of 
the firm's equity. 
As Jensen and Meckling have stated, the magnitude of 
equity agency costs will tend to vary from firm to firm and 
will be determined by the tastes of the managers; the ease 
with which they can behave according to personal preference 
instead of according to value maximizing behavior; the cost 
of monitoring and bonding activities; the cost of evaluating 
and measuring the manager's performance; the cost of design-
ing and enforcing specific behavioral rules and policies; and 
the cost of replacing the manager when the manager has less 
than a controlling interest in the firm. The size of the 
agency costs will also be constrained by the the capital 
market, i.e., the market for the firm . 
To analyze further the magnitude of the agency costs and 
their relationship to the size of the firm, we make the 
following assumptions : 
1. All outside financing is done through equity. (This 
assumption is dropped later.) 
2. The firm is owned and managed by the same person. 
3. Outside equity is voting . 
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4 . The firm has available t o i t sufficient investment 
o ppo rtunities to grow if it so desires . 
5. Capital markets are efficient. 
6 . Investors are rational. 
It is assume d that a firm follows the following path : 
First , t here is a range where the o wner - manager is ab l e to 
finance a ll the investments with his o wn resources . I n this 
range, the agency costs of equity are zero. In Figure 2 . 1, 
this region is represented by OA. In the second range, AB , 
the manager chooses to sell some equity shares in o rder to 
inc rease t he s i ze of the firm through some s o rt of profitabl e 
i nvestment o ppo rtunity because e ithe r his own funds are 
exhausted o r he ho lds a diversified portfolio of assets and 
d oes no t want to inc rease the fraction rep resented by the 
firm in his portfolio . ( We are assuming for the mome nt that 
the firm has no debt available to it .) In thi s range, the 
manager ' s fractional ownership decreases but he still has 
decison- making power . What is meant by dec ision- making power 
is that he has the maj o rity of the votes and his decisions 
c an eas ily be enforced. He would demand compensation ove r and 
above the fai r market value o f his securities for this deci-
sion-making power . The owner-manager derives utility from his 
non-pecuniary activities but also from the dollar weal th 
coming from his shares of equity . The utility aris ing from a 
c ombination o f pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources is greater 
than the utility he can derive from eliminating absolutely 
Relative 
Equity 
Agency 
Costs 
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0 A B C Size 
Figure 2.1. Ownership Structure, Firm Size and 
Relative Equity Agency Costs 
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his perk consumption and maximizing the value of the firm . 
Consequently, he will only sell the firm for a price that 
exceeds the value maximizing price. The range AB starts as 
soon as the owner-manager begins selling outside equity and 
continues until he loses control of the firm. How soon he 
loses control depends, among other things, on how diffuse 
outside shareholders are. The less diffuse outside ownership 
is, the faster the owner-manager may lose his managerial 
rights. 
As long as the owner-manager has managerial rights, 
agency costs are going to increase, since a lower ownership 
fraction increases the incentive to consume on the job and , 
therefore, increases the agency costs. When the manager has 
sold more claims (in order to finance investments ) to the 
point in which his control of the firm is weakened, his 
consumption of perquisites will start declining because, in 
effect, he has entered the managerial labor market. If his 
performance as a manager does not satisfy the outside share-
holders, the manager can readily be replaced at a lower cost 
than when he had control of the firm. Therefore , the risk 
that he faces in this range of losing his job limits his 
consumption of perquisites. This stage is given by BC in 
Figure 2.1. 
The characteristics of this third stage are that the 
manager has rel atively little ownerghip interest in the firm, 
which is typical of large corporations. According to Fama 
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(1980), a3 will be di3CU53ed below , equity agency co3ts for 
large corporation3 are mini mal . 
Ref ersnce can be made to a concept of the firm which 
differs from the traditionai one . Fama (1 980) argue3 that 
the firm can be viewed as a set of contracts among factors 
of production . It is viewed as a team in which the members 
act from self -interest but realize that their destinies de-
pend t o some extent on the survival of the team in its compe-
tition with other teams . 
In this sense, the firm is disciplined by competition 
from othe r firms. This process generates ways o f efficiently 
monito ring the perf o rmance of the entire team and its indi-
vidual members. Indivi dual members of the team, particularly 
the managers, are sub ject t o the discipline with in the firm 
and also to t he d iscipline dictate d by the market. Managers 
also take the opportunities provided by the market. 
To understand the behavio r of large co r porations , Fama 
suggests that we view management and shareholders as separate 
facto rs of production, each faced wi th a market which offers 
alternative opportunities for its servic e. In the particular 
c ase of manage ment , this market provides incentives t o strive 
for good perf ormance . 
Holders o f securities have the capital market available 
to them, and this allows them to exchange securities at a 
relatively low cost in their aim to diversify their po rtfo-
lios among many firms. This is consistent with rational 
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behavior according to portfolio theory . Therefore, an indi-
vidual security holder of a large corporation does not have 
any int erest in personally monitoring the activities of any 
firm. Efficient allocation of resources leads to a large 
degree of separation of security ownership from control of 
the firm . 
The managers rent their human capital, which is many 
times the main source o f their wealth, and have a special 
interest in the survival o f the firm. The success or failure 
o f the firm affects the manager's future wage signaled by the 
managerial labor market . According to Fama, the value of the 
firm is an important variable for the managerial market when 
evaluating the firm's management . Fama argues that when the 
firm's reward system is not responsive to perfo rmance, given 
a competitive manageria l market, it will l o se its managers . 
To address the question of why equity agenc y costs a re 
minimized under diversified ownership , reference c an be made 
t o the internal monito ring of managers by managers from bo th 
above and below. Managers usually control the board o f di-
rec t o rs , which may be efficient because positions in i t are 
highly sensitive to performance . Inc lusion of outside direc-
tors, who are also disciplined by the market for their ser-
vice, prevents management from collusion and expropriation of 
wealth from the owners of claims on the firm . Acco rding t o 
Fama (1980 ), the board can be l ooked at as a l ow cost mecha-
nism t o replac e or reorder t op management. 
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Fama analyzes situations in which costs arising from the 
managerial incentive problem could be resolved. If the mana-
garial labor market were efficient, it would impose a wage 
reevaluation which would permit a full ex post settling up 
for deviations from the contract. This solution is desirable 
because managers' abilities and tastes for perquisites are 
not known with certainty and are only imputed by past per-
formance. Efficient managerial markets imply correct use of 
past information to revise future wages and to assign a 
weight in the wage revision large enough to take care of any 
potential problem generated by managerial incentives . There-
fore, efficient managerial labor markets guarantee a full ex 
post settling up, and related agency costs would be reduced. 
With full ex post settling up, the manager's current marginal 
product is absorbed by the stream of his future wages. 
Alternatively, if security holders are risk averse , they 
c ould set a fixed discount on the wage to prevent incomplete 
settling up due to a manager switching firms. The manager 
can also contract to accept his ex post measured marginal 
product at the end of each period in order to mantain his 
freedom to switch firms. In his article, Fama provides 
examples of ex post settling up through the wage revision 
process making specific assumptions about the stochastic 
evolution of a manager 's measured marginal product and how 
the managerial market uses information from the process to 
adjust the manager's future wages to reach full expost 
20 
settling up. 
Thus, in Fama's view, 
The viability of the large corporation with diffuse 
security ownership is better explained in terms of a 
model where the primary disciplining of the manager 
comes through managerial labor markets, both within and 
outside of the firm, with assistance of the panoply of 
internal and external monitoring devices that evolve to 
stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the corporate form, 
and with the market of outside takeovers providing 
discipline of last resource (1980 , p . 542). 
The above discussion is intended to establish a sound 
basis to bring out the differences between small amd large 
corporations with respect to equity agency costs. The main 
arguments used are those of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Fama (1980). The point of view taken here is that Jensen and 
Meckling's analysis applies to small corporations, while 
Fama's arguments apply primarily to large ones. 
If we relax the assumption that all outside financing is 
done by equity and we allow debt into the picture, then the 
owner-manager has the opportunity o f financing his invest-
ments with debt instead of equity. Agency costs of equity 
will be eliminated as long as the manager does not have any 
outside equity. But agency costs of debt will be generated 
as debt is employed in the capital structure. These agency 
costs will be analyzed in Section C of this chapter . The 
manager's decision on how to finance his projects will depend 
primarily on the relative magnitude of debt and equity agency 
costs, the size of tax subsidies generated by debt, and the 
magnitude of the flotation costs. In this analysis, flota-
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tion costs are incorporated by adding them to the equity 
agency costs and assuming that flotation costs arise only 
when outside equity is issuea. (Alternatively , we could add 
the difference in equity and debt flotation costs to the 
agency costs of equity .) Flotation costs decrease as the 
size of the issue increases . If we assume that the size of 
the issue is di r ectly proportional to the size of the firm , 
we can say that as the size of the firm increases, flotati on 
costs dec~ease. 
Graphically, this is shown in Figure 2 . 2 . In this 
figure, the perpendicular distance from the X axis t o the 
line HT represents the flotation costs. The assumption that 
all outside financing is done through equity is maintained. 
If debt is incorporated in the graph, as in Figure 2.3 , 
agenc y costs·of equity will decrease as outs ide equity is 
replaced by debt. Figure 2.4 shows ho w the owner-manager can 
postpone the generation of equity agency costs and flotati o n 
costs by issuing debt instead of equity . 
Summarizing: A) for a who lly equity financed firm, 
go ing back to Figure 2 .1 
~ = equity agency costs 
6 = 0 from 0 to A (no outside equity) 
at:l > 0 from A to B (as the manager's fractional 
a Size 
ownership of the firm decreases) 
at! < 0 from B to c (as the manager loses 
a Size 
control power over the firm) 
Relative 
Agency 
Costs and 
Flotation 
Costs 
Relative 
Agency 
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/' Equity Agency Costs + 
/ ~ ~ Flotation Costs 
/ '-...."><-Equity Agency Costs 
~ Flo tation Costs 
0 A B c Size 
Fjgure 2. 2 . Agency Costs and Flotation Costs 
Costs and agency 
flotation 
Costs 
Relative 
Agency 
Costs and 
Flotation 
Costs 
0 A B c Size 
Figure 2 . 3 . Equity Agenc y Costs 
~ If Debt is '<" i~sued ~itially 
...... • 
0 A A' B B' Size 
Figure 2.4 . Equity Agency Costs 
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considering flotation costs : 
a Flotation Costs < 0 
a Size 
B) when debt is brought into the picture, 
__..;a;..._6~~~~~~~~- < o 
a (Debt / Total Value) 
Therefo re, 
~ = f (size, fractional ownership , flotation costs, debt ) 
The fractional ownership in this analysis assumes t hat 
we are dea~ing with an owner-manager that has decision making 
power. The inverse relationship between equity agency costs 
and fract ional ownership means that as the firm grows and the 
financing is d o ne through o utside equity, fractional owner -
ship decreases and agency costs increase. What has to be 
kept in mind is that as the firm grows, f o llo wing this path, 
agency costs of equity increase thus determining the upward 
sl o ping portion of t he curve . The downward slo ping portio n 
o f the c urve is explained by diversifi ed ownership and the 
manager being disciplined by the l abo r market withi n and 
outside the firm. 
Other equity agenc y cost analyses which are found in the 
literature should also be mentioned. Easterbrook ( 1984 ) , f o r 
example , tries to give an agency cost explanation to divi-
dends . He analyzes how dividends can set up a mechanism that 
reduces the agency costs of management and that prevents o ne 
group o f investors from taking advantage of the o thers. He 
refers to the agency costs arising from the divergence o f 
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interests between investors and managers. He also points out 
another source of agency costs, which is risk aversion by the 
managers. Managers generally invest a large portion of their 
wealth, their human capital, in the firm . The other inves-
tors in the firm, on the other hand, usually hold a well 
diversified portfolio. The performance of the firm will 
affect the manager to a greater extent, and, therefore, his 
personal risk aversion will go against the shareholders' 
preference for risk. He would tend to select projects with 
both low risk and low expected returns . Of course creditors 
do not like risk and they adjust their demanded return in 
accordance with their perception of the riskiness of a par-
ticular firm. 
Managers, Easterbrook observes, are able to alter the 
risk status of the firm not only by changing the mix of the 
projects but also by changing the firm's debt-equity ratio. 
The lower the debt-equity ratio, the lower the risk. 
If a manager first issues debt and then finances new 
projects out of retained earnings, the debt-equity ratio 
falls and so does the risk of the firm transferring wealth 
from shareholders to bondholders because the riskiness of the 
outstanding debt falls. Easterbrook considers that a way out 
of the transfer of wealth is through dividends. Of course, 
bondholders do not like dividends. They feel that they also 
could be taken advantage of by shareholders given that a rate 
of interest has been set already. 
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Easterbrook believes that the monitoring problem and 
the risk aversion problem can be lessened. Managers would be 
more likely to behave in the investors• interest if the firm 
were constantly in the market for new capital . This activity 
allows the revision of the state of the firm because invest-
ment bankers act as monitors of the collective interest of 
the shareholders and disclose information relevant to the 
security holders . This process allows the firm to adjust 
debt-equity ratios so that neither group of investors takes 
advantage of the other. Another advantage is that contribu-
tors of capital are very good monitors of managers. New 
investors are better than old ones at being able to reduce 
agency costs. Thus. managers have incentives to reduce these 
agency costs in order to collect the highest possible price 
for new securities. 
Underwriters of stock and large lenders are able to 
supply information to investors at low cost, since by provi -
ding their services. the underwriters are undertaking risk 
and the more information they are able to obtain, the lower 
the risk. 
The relationship between dividends, agency problems, and 
the frequent visit to the capital markets should be easily 
seen. As Easterbrook notes, expected continuing dividends 
force the firm to raise new money in order to pay dividends, 
investment, and capital requirements . Dividends by them-
selves, even without the use of capital markets, may adjust 
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the debt-equity ratio in such a way as to prevent transfers 
o f wealth from stockholders to bondholders. Dividends serve 
as ex post adjustments for many types of contracts. Even 
though dividends are not the only way of disclosing informa-
tion and the agency costs explanation of dividends is not 
unique, it is an alternative that in many cases is cheaper. 
For example, it may be cheaper than accommodation through 
expost negotiations of controls . 
The agency cost explanation for dividends focusses on 
constant and regular payout policies rather than on changes 
in dividends. This approach implies that dividends are 
worthless in themselves. If the firm needs to go to the 
capita l market for motives other than dividends, then it 
would pay out less in dividends than a firm whose sole pur-
pose was to minimize the agency costs o f equity. The impli-
cation would be that growing firms do not need dividends as a 
method to reduce agency costs. According to Easterbrook, old 
firms would use dividends as a device f r om the capital market 
to control agency costs. He also argues that if the man~ger 
holds substantial residual claims in the firm, dividends 
would be less valuable and would decrease. 
The question addressed here is how this dividend method 
would affect small and large corporations. Small firms do 
not need to use dividends as a way of controlling agency 
costs because they are in a growing state and, therefore, 
visit the market anyway. At the first stage of our model, 
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there is an owner-manager and no outside equity, so the type 
of agency cost discussed in the dividend approach does not 
even exist. As we move into the second stage of the model, 
where the owner-manager issues outside equity, the firm is at 
a growing state but the owner- manager still has control 
power. We have to be careful, for agency costs of equity do 
exist but are n o t identical t o the agency costs faced by 
large corporations . Bot h managers wil l tend to consume more 
perquisites than is optimal acco rding t o the stockholders . 
But the situation of the owner- manager is different from that 
of the manager o f a large c orporation because the owner 
manager has wealth invested in the firm . His behavior with 
respect to the risk o f i nvestments involves both risk prefer-
ence, for he is an owner , and r i s k avers ion, for he is also a 
manager . It is , therefore , no t p o ss i ble t o say that the 
manager is unambiguously r i sk averse , s o the ro l e o f the 
dividends as a correcto r of risk aversio n would no t apply . 
Also , the decision of dividend po lic y is mainly in the o wner-
manager ' s hands . Large fir.ms have more alternative avai lable 
t o them . They may consider divi dends as a way of minimizing 
agency costs. This argument is in accordance with the de-
creasing function of equity agency costs f o r large corpora-
tions with diversified ownership and managers who do not own 
shares in the firm. In Easterbrook's view, the payment of 
excessive dividends offers a procedure by which agency costs 
can be minimized. 
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B. Informational A8ymmetry Agency Costs 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ( 198lb) and Jensen and Mec-
kling (1976), among other8, consider informational asymme-
tries ae an agency problem . Informational asymmetry arieee 
when management 8eeks to finance a project by selling securi-
ties, and the true nature of the return distribution of the 
project is unknown to the outside market . In this case, it 
is not possible for the market, without the information 
possessed by management, to identify the true nature of the 
project a priori. Because it is impossible for management to 
disclose this info rmati on costlessly to the . market, the price 
that investors are willing to offer for the securities re-
flects thls informati onal asymmetry . This price is less than 
the fair value reflected in the true nature of the project . 
The difference between the fair value and t he actual . price is 
the agency cost generated by informationa l asymmetry . Bar-
nea, Haugen and Senbet ( 198lb) emphasize the fact t hat these 
costs cannot be reso lved costlessly through arbitrage in the 
financial market . In this sense, the costs become signifi-
c ant by inducing yield differentials between securities and, 
consequently, affecting c apital structure determination . 
This particular agency cost affec ts fixed as well as 
residual type of claims. It c an be resolved at a cost 
through various signaling mechanisms. But t he problem of 
informational asymmetry does not only consist of trying to 
unambiguously identify the nature of the projec t ; it also 
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involves the costs and efforts of trying to identify the 
nature of the current distribution of returns to the entire 
firm whenever additional financing is needed. 
Stewart Myers (1984), in his 1983 Presidential Address 
to the American Finance Association, examines the importance 
of the informational asymmetry problem . His analysis further 
extends the scope of the problem. He assumes that aside from 
information asymmetry, capital markets are perfect and semi-
strong efficient. In another article that treats this sub-
ject more in detail, Myers and Majluf (198 4 ) find the most 
probable objective that managers pursue in the presence of 
informational asymmetry to be the maximization of the true or 
intrinsic value of the firm's existing shares. New investors 
who purchase any stock issue will assume that the manager is 
trying to maximize the old shareholders' wealth, so they will 
adjust the price they are willing to pay . Myers' innovation 
in approaching the problem is that he acknowledges the fact 
that because of informational asymmetry, the price of stock 
may be not only be undervalued but also overvalued . That is, 
the manager's inside information can be either favorable or 
unfavorable. 
In the case of having unfavorable information, Myers 
assumes that the manager has an incentive to issue securities 
(equity) even if NPV = 0 because he behaves according to the 
interest of the old shareholders, and in this case the secu-
rities will be overvalued , therefore, allowing old security 
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holders to take advantage of new security holders. On the 
other hand, if information is favorable, the firm may rather 
not undertake positive NPV investment opportunities than 
issue undervalued shares. This latter possibility implies a 
cost of external financing that is different from administra-
tive and underwriting costs or the underpricing of new 
securities . 
Firms will issue and invest if the NPV of their projects 
is greater than or equal to X, the amount by which new shares 
are undervalued or overvalued. X is endogenous in this model, 
meaning that it is not under the control of the manager. The 
way to reduce X and thereby increase the possibility of 
having more positive NPV investments is by issuing the safest 
possible securities. These securities are described by Myers 
as those for which future value changes least when the mana-
ger's inside information is revealed to the market. Myers 
notes that even though X is endogenous, there are cases in 
which the absolute value of X is always less for debt than 
for equity. 
fault risk . 
X would be zero for debt which is free of de-
This model, therefore, suggests that if the 
manager has favorable information, firms are forced by in-
vestors to issue debt, unless they have already exhausted 
their debt capacity and would incur substantial additional 
costs by issuing any more debt. On the other hand, if the 
information is unfavorable, it is in the interest of the old 
security holders to maximize X in order to take advantage of 
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new security holders. Managers will, therefore, issue equity 
in this situation . In Myers' words, the best path to follow 
seems ~o be to "issue debt when investors undervalue the firm 
and equity when they overvalue it" (1984, p.585) . This model 
predicts that the announcement of a stock issue will cause 
stock prices to fall . It also predicts that stock prices 
should not fall, all else being equal , if risk free debt is 
issued instead . By the same token , a high grade debt issue 
should have an average stock price impact smaller than the 
one o f a stock issue. This implies that investors would 
effectively force the firm to issue debt initially since 
equity issues c arry unfavorable information. 
When a firm decides to c arry out i ts external financ ing 
through debt , it faces asymmetr ic i nformatio n problems and 
other debt related agency pro b l ems which are an increasing 
function of debt. As debt increases, t he fi rm fac es higher 
probability o f entering a s ituation of financi al distress and 
also a higher probability that future positive-NPV projects 
are not undertaken because management will be reluctant t o 
finance them by issuing equity due to the informational 
asymmetry problem. A p ossible way of evading this situation 
is to issue equity now. Equity would thus not be used t o 
f inanc e a real investment; it would be used to reduce the 
possibility of financial distress and of passing positive NPV 
projects . Issuing stock in this way is a way of buying debt 
c apacity. The problem that arises i s that t he equity issued 
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for obtaining debt capacity faces the same asymmetry of 
information problems as the equity issued to finance real 
i nvestment . The decision on which form of financing to use 
would havQ to compare the magnitude of the agency costs 
arising from increasing debt against the cost of losing some 
positive NPV projects due to asymmetry of information and the 
corresponding equity agency costs of issuing common stock 
(while, of course, taking into account such factors as under-
writing and administrative costs) . In conclusion , asymmetry 
of information affects the prices of both risky debt and 
equity, but according to Myers, it seems to affect the latter 
to a greater extent. 
We address next the question of h ow problems of asymmet-
rical information affect small and large corporations differ-
ently . First, recall that agency costs of equity are more 
relevant to the capital structure decision o f small corpora-
tions bec ause they are an increasing functi on of size for the 
small firm but that they are negligible for the large firm. 
Note also that flotation costs are a decreasing function of 
size and thereby affect small corporations to a greater 
extent than they affect large corporations . Furthermore, it 
has been shown empirically that economies of scale exist in 
the administrative handling of equity issues (Miller, 1961). 
Here, once again, small corporations are at a disadvantage. 
If we sum all these factors, we can conclude that it is 
rational for small corporations to postpone the issuance of 
33 
equity ae long as possible. But this has its disadvantages, 
too. Among these are the increase of the debt to total value 
ratio, which generates debt related agency costs and which 
increases the asymmetry of information costs since the debt 
becomes riskier. This places the firm in a vulnerable posi-
tion because in the event of issuing new securities, the 
asymmetry o f information problems will involve risky debt or 
equity and the costs arising from the difference between the 
fair value of the securities and the actual value obtained 
can be considerable. Eventually, the small firm wi ll issue 
equity when the sum of the informational asymmetry costs 
generated by risky debt plus the debt agency costs outweigh 
the informational asymmetry costs associated with the issu-
ance o f equity. Large corporati ons do not face all the above 
mentioned cost disadvantages . They can maintain, if they 
desire , a debt capacity by issuing e quity. It is true that 
they will face the corresponding asymmetry o f information 
problems, but they are able to dec rease the asymmetry of 
information of the existing and future debt issues . They 
have at their disposal high grade debt issues, and they do 
not worry too much about administrative, flotation , o r equity 
agency costs generated by the issuance of common stock. In 
other words, they have a greater financial flexibility than 
their small counterparts and, therefore, more control power 
over their capital structure , whic h in turn allows them to 
keep both agency costs and asymmetry of information problems 
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at a low level. Small corporations, like large ones, pursue 
cost minimization, but, due to their lack of flexibility, 
small f irm5 face relatively larger costs from informational 
asymmetry problems 
C. The Agency Costs of Debt 
This section contains an analysis of four debt related 
agency costs: Part 1 deals with the incentive effect asso-
ciated with levered firms and discusses the monitoring costs 
these incentive effects engender; Part 2 focuses on the 
incentive of stockholders to forgo a profitable investment; 
Part 3 discusses liquidation agency costs; and Part 4 looks 
at the agency costs of bankruptcy . It is important to mention 
that s ome of these agency costs are interrelated and some 
help minimize o thers . 
1 . Risk incentive effects associated with levered firms 
Certain incentive effects arise in the presence of debt. 
They are one of the primary reasons for which one does not 
see corpo rations financed entirely o r almost entirely by 
debt . The incentive effect refers to the behavior of the 
manager of a heavily levered firm. Here, we assume that the 
manager acts to maximize the value of the firm . He will 
engage in activities that if successful would have very high 
payoffs, even if the probability of success is very low . This 
would be perfectly rational behavior because in the case of 
success the shareholder receives the gain while in the case 
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of failure it is the debtholder who bears the coet . 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others have analyzed this 
problem using the analogy of equity claims as European call 
options in the context of the Black and Scholes (1973) option 
pricing model. In this framework, a share of equity is 
viewed as a European call option on the total value of the 
firm and the face value of debt is viewed as the exercise 
price. The equity holders would buy back the firm from 
creditors at an exercise value equal to the face value of the 
debt . The Black and Scholes model establishes a positive 
relationship between the variance of the cash flows under-
lying the assets and the value of the call option. The 
manager wo uld increase the value of the call or, in this 
case, of the equity shares by choosing high risk projects at 
the expense of the debtholders. 
To illustrate how these risk incentives can generate 
agency costs, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981b) use the 
following situations: If two projects are available to the 
firm and they have the same expected value but different 
variances, the distribution of the value of the firm between 
stockholders and bondholders would be affected but not the 
total value of the firm . The problem arises when the two 
projects have, in addition to different variances , different 
values. In this situation, bondholders would either monitor 
the stockholders to make sure they do not undertake the low 
value, high risk project or else, as rational bondholders, 
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they would pay a lower price for these bonds. This lower 
price reflects the inferiority of the value of the project 
and the higher risk, which benefits the equity holders. 
In the absence of monitoring costs, the stockholders are 
forced to adopt the low value project. This follows from the 
fact that the initial price of the bonds is low. If after 
the bonds have been sold, management decides to finance the 
superior project, the bond price would increase, but , due to 
the lower risk , the stock price would decreasG, which is not 
an attractive alternative for the stockholders. The agency 
cost, in this cas~. is the difference in the values of the 
projects. If the stockholders continue to bear unwarranted 
risks, the total value of the firm will be low. 
Monito ring and bonding activities, as noted in chapter 
I, help eliminate or at least minimize the risk incentive 
agency cost. These a c tivities involve, for example, the in-
clusion of convenants in monitoring activities to the point 
where their marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of 
engaging in them . In this analysis , at the firm level, the 
stockholder bears the entire wealth effect of these agency 
costs. It is in the stockholder's interest to see that 
agency costs are minimized and bonding activities are under-
taken, when beneficial . In conclusion, these agency costs 
tend to discourage the use of corporate debt . 
The differential impact of debt-risk-incentive agency 
costs on small and large firms is examined next . We can 
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relax the assumption made at the beginning of Part one that 
the manager acts to maximize the value of the firm and as-
su~e. as before, that owner-managers behave differently from 
managers with no ownership interest in the firm , that small 
firms are characterized by such owner-managers, and that , in 
general, owner-managers are willing to undertake more risk 
than large corporation managers because they see their shares 
as options, with a value that increases as risk increases. 
Managers of large corporations are risk averse because they 
do not own any residual claims and they generally have all 
their wealth (in the form of managerial services) invested in 
the firm and are highly concerned about the security o f their 
jobs. They consequently favor low risk projects. The beha-
vior of large corpo ration managers benefits debtholders and 
dec reases the debt agency costs related to risk incentive 
problems . Small corporations , either wholly owned o r par-
tially owned by a manager with control power, tend to choo se 
riskier projects than large corporations, when financing 
through debt, thereby generating higher debt-ri sk-incentive 
agency costs . 
2. Costs associated with stockho lders' incentive t o forgo 
profitable investment opportunities 
Myers (1977) has analyzed the problem of the stockhold-
ers ' incentive to forgo profitable investment. He attempts 
to explain why it may be rational for firms to limit b o rrow-
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ing . In his analysis, he assumes that capital markets are 
strictly perfect , efficient , and complete . He argues that 
most firms are valued as going concerns with the value of the 
firm reflecting an expectation of continuing future invest-
ments in the firm. 
One of the components of the value of the firm is, thus, 
the present value o f options to undertake future investments. 
The value of this component depends on whether or not the 
firm decides it will exercise these options. Myers' paper 
shows how a firm with risky debt outstanding and which acts 
in the stockholders' interest will act differently from a 
purely equity financed firm or a firm financed with risk free 
debt . Myers concludes that in some instanc es a firm that has 
risky debt outstanding will no t undertake valuable investment 
opportunities whi c h would increase the market value of the 
firm . The sub- optimal investment policy constitutes an agen-
c y c ost induced by risky debt. 
Myers makes a distinction between assets that can be 
regarded as call options in the sense that their ultimate 
values depend, at least in part, on further discretionary 
investment by the firm and assets whose ultimate value does 
not depend on further discretionary investment. He distin-
guishes between assets already in place and assets not yet in 
place, i.e., the present value of the future investment 
options . He shows that the amount o f debt supported by the 
present value of future growth opportunities, everything else 
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held equal, would be lees than the amount of debt supported 
by assets already in place because some of the investment 
opportunities may not be undertaken. 
The fact that there might be some states where these 
investment options are not exercised implies, for example, 
that a firm possessing only future growth o ppo rtunities can 
issue only risky debt to reduce the required initial equity 
investment. Another important factor is the maturity of 
debt. Consider a firm with only future growth opportunities 
and with a debt that matures befo r e the investment decision 
is made but after the true state o f nature is known. The 
investment will be undertaken by stoc kho lders i f the present 
value of the return on the investment i s greater than the 
value of the debt , o r by debt holders i f t he value of the 
firm after the investment is greater than the investment 
capital required. In this case , b orrowing is a matter of 
indifference . 
The firm ' s investment decisions wil l be d i fferent if the 
debt matures after the firm's investment optio n expires . In 
this case, the outstanding debt will determine the investment 
decisions of the firm . The shareho lders will exercise only 
if the revenues from the project are greater t han the invest-
ment outlay plus the outstanding debt . The greater the level 
of debt, the larger the probability of the investment options 
not being exerc ised by the shareholders . In the event the 
investment option is not exercised, the creditors will not 
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receive anything. If debt is aet high enough, the present 
value of the returna of the investment can be lesa than the 
sum of the capital requirements of the investment plus the 
debt in all states . The firm is worthless since the invest-
ment options are unexercised. Myers uses these extreme situ-
ations to show how the existence of corporate debt can reduce 
the present market value of the firm by weakening the corpo-
ration's incentive to undertake profitable future inves-
tments. 
Monitoring might solve the problem posed by Hyers, but 
monitoring is in general very costly. An alternative solu-
tion to monitoring is to use covenants. Covenants can de-
crease the number of investments that from the point of view 
of the shareholders are not worthwhile but that might be 
beneficial from the point of view of the debtholders. How-
ever, some of these covenants have the shortcoming of having 
the firm undertake a negative NPV investment , and thereby 
opening the door to a potentially extremely inefficient way 
of allocating resources. 
Myers observes that a plausible but still costly solu-
tion would be that of permanent debt capital through a policy 
of rolling over short term maturity claims. He favors this 
type of debt because it is very flexible. As mentioned be-
fore, debt that matures before an investment option is to be 
exercised does not induce sub-optimal investment decisions . 
Borrowing short term does not eliminate monitoring costs, but 
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does provide the flexibility to modify the capital structure 
of the firm . 
The main purpose h~re is to highlight the differences 
between small and large firms and to show how these differen-
ces affect the decision making process with respect to capi-
tal structure. With respect to growth opportunities, ana-
lyzed by Myers, it can be said that the small corporations 
that are most relevant to this particular problem are the 
ones with high growth rates. They play an important role in 
determining the equilibrium interest rate for the group of 
small firms sinc e they are, in general, far mo re likely to 
enter the public capital market for debt as well as equity 
and, therefore, must face the associated agency costs. 
To enter the public capital market , small firms must 
have reasonable growth opportunities . According to Miller 
( 1961 ), for example , the main characteristic that an under-
writer looks for when deciding whether o r not to undertake a 
public equity o r debt issue is the outlook and trend for 
future earnings. For our purposes, we assume that the small 
corporations which have high growth rates and which have a 
large component of their value represented by their growth 
opportunities are at the margin the ones that determine the 
equilibrium rate for the small firm sector. For large corpo-
rations, on the other hand, even in the case when a substan-
tial package of growth opportunities is still available, the 
component of growth opportunities tends to be outweighed by 
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assets in place whose value does not depend on further dis-
cretionary investment. 
Myers• approach regarding the incentive problem to forgo 
profitable investments, therefore, leads us to conclude that, 
in order to decrease the risk of their securities and in-
crease their price, small firms with growth opportunities 
should have less debt in their capital structure than large 
firms. This result, however , is a partial conclusion and 
does not consider other important factors. such as tax subsi-
dy and equity agency costs, which should be weighed against 
the debt agency costs in the financing decision. 
Next consider the monitoring costs incurred by the debt 
holders to prevent shareholders from letting profitable op-
portunities pass by . These c o sts are directly proportional 
to the percentage of the value of the firm represented by 
growth opportunities . Monitoring activities are aimed at 
limiting the possibilities of transferring capital to the 
firm owners. Monitoring is less successful in the case of 
the firm with an owner-manager because the owner-manager can 
take advantage of the possibility of consuming non-pecuniary 
benefits . This factor places small firms in a position of 
disadvantage with respect to large , widely diversified firms . 
Monitoring costs , which are agency costs, would be relatively 
higher for small firms than for large ones. This aspect of 
the monitoring cost reinforces the agency costs associated 
with growth opportunities, that is, small firms face higher 
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debt agency costs arising from the f orgoing of profitable 
investment opportunities and should, therefore, issue less 
debt, everything else being equal. 
We can conclude from the above arguments that if we have 
a large and a small firm with the same capital structure, 
everything else being equal, the small firm would have rela-
tively higher agency costs of debt associated with the stock-
h o lders' incentive to forgo profitable investment opportuni-
ties . 
3. Liquidation agency costs 
Liquidation of a firm occurs whenever the liquidation 
value of the firm is greater than its o perating value. Tit -
man (1983) analyzes an important agency relationship between 
security holders (as agents) and other associates of the firm 
( as principals). The principals face certain costs in the 
event of the liquidation of the firm. The costs that Titman 
refers to are, for example , those that workers and suppliers 
have to incur when they have job specific capital, o r the 
increased expenses of customers. In his paper, Titman demon-
strates that these liquidation costs, along with all the 
other agency costs, have important implications that are 
relevant to the theory of optimal capital structure. 
In particular, Titman analyzes the agency relationship 
between security holders and customers . If customers and 
other associates rationally evaluate the probability of li-
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quidation of the firm, the firm will bear the imposed liqui-
dation cost ex-ante. This happens because, for example, the 
c ustomers adjust the prices they are willing to pay for a 
durable good, taking into account the probability of lquida-
tion of the firm. There is, of course, an inverse rel ation-
ship between the probability of liquidation and the price the 
customer is willing to pay because of the increase in expec-
ted maintenance costs. 
According to Titman, if a firm wants to insure the 
implementation o f its value maximizing liquidation policy, it 
has to bond itself so that it will not undertake actions that 
would be rational under some circumstances in the future, but 
whose probability of occurrence affects the value of the firm 
negatively at the present time. 
Titman ( 1983 ) shows that the c apital structure o f a firm 
can affect its decision to liquidate, and that it is a deter-
minant facto r of the states of nature in which bondholders 
control liquidation policy. He suggests that the firm can 
choose an appropriate capital structure that bonds it to 
implement an optimal liquidation policy. When a firm con-
trols its liquidation decisions it can effectively affect the 
terms of trade at which it does business with its customers, 
workers and suppliers. 
He constructs a simple model where before the product is 
sold, a value maximizing firm should implement a liquidation 
policy that liquidates only when the value of its assets 
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exceeds their operating value by an amount larger than the 
costs imposed on the customers due to liquidation. Since 
consumers will rationally forecast the liquidation policy and 
will adjust the prices they are willing to pay for the prod-
uct, it is in the interest of the firm to prespecify its 
liquidation policy. One way in which the firm can accomplish 
this is through its capital structure, which may be cheaper 
than the writing and enforcement of state contingent con-
tracts. In this mode, stockholders have a stronger prefer-
ence for continuing to operate the firm because they have the 
lowest priority claims to the liquidation proceeds . On the 
other hand, bondholders have the highest prio rity t o the 
proceeds and therefore have the strongest preference for 
liquidating the firm . 
Based on his model , Titman concludes that an appropriate 
selection of capital structure assures that equity holders 
will operate the firm in those states where the firm is not 
bankrupt, but that in those states where bankruptcy is immi-
nent, control is transferred to the bondholders, who will 
liquidate the firm when liquidation is consistent with opti-
mal liquidation policy. Any deviation from that policy will 
be reflected in the prices of the products and debt claims of 
the firms . These deviations are the agency costs, and these 
costs are borne by the equity holders . Of course liquidation 
policy is not the only thing that has to be taken into ac-
count when deciding on an optimal capital structure; other 
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factors that favor an increase in the level of debt should be 
weighed against the negative effect that this would have on 
product prices and the price of the debt claims. 
In many inetances, small corporations have to undersell 
in the market in order to compete with well-known products 
from larger corporations. This lack of confidence on the 
part of the customers may reflect the fact that in general 
they place a higher probability of liquidation on the smaller 
corporation, everything else being equal. 
Titman's theory predicts that, in general, firms which 
can potentially impose costs on their associates if they 
liquidate, select capital structures with relatively low debt 
to equity ratios, while firms that produce relatively short-
lived products choose a high debt to equity ratio . 
Due to all the higher costs that a small firm has to 
face, it is reasonable to suppose the small firm has fewer 
choices than its large counterpart if it decides to issue 
equity publicly . For some states, the equity markets are for 
all intents and purposes inaccessible to the small firm. 
This reality implies that the small firm will tend to be more 
levered, and as debt increases, so does the probability of 
bankruptcy. According to Titman, as the probability of bank-
ruptcy increases, bondholders will take over and might decide 
to liquidate the firm, even if this is not optimal policy for 
the stockholders. 
Based on Titman's model, one could argue that small 
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corporations in a durable goods industry have a tougher time 
than small corporations in a short -lived product or a consu-
mer industry. As mentioned before, the fact that small cor-
porations charge lower prices might be partially explained by 
a sub-optimal liquidation policy. 
Liquidation can occur even if the liquidation value of 
the firm is less than the operating value. If control passes 
to the bondholders because the firm is bankrupt and highly 
levered, it is in the bondholders' interest to liquidate in 
o rder to maximize their wealth, even if it is not optimal to 
liquidate at that moment . Because of the lower flexibility 
which small firms have in choosing debt versus equity claims, 
they probably face this problem more often than large corpo-
rations. 
4. Bankruptcy agency costs 
Bankruptcy occurs when a firm is unable to meet current 
payment obligations or when it violates one o r mo re of the 
indenture provisions which allow bankruptcy. In the event of 
bankruptcy, the control passes to the bondholders or credi-
tors. The stockholder loses all claims on the firm , and t he 
negative difference (if one exists) between the market value 
of the firm and the value of debt is borne by the debt-
holders . 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have mentioned that it is 
very diffic ult for the firm to write and enforce state con-
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tingent contracts. In the event of financial distress, the 
problem of setting the priorities of the claims arises and 
many times causes bankruptcy. 
The probability of bankruptcy is a determinant of the 
price of the fixed claims of the firm because, in the event 
of bankruptcy, the value of the firm would be reduced due to 
the fact that payments have to be made to third parties other 
than bondholders and stockholders. Rational bondholders will 
adjust their price according to their perceived probability 
of bankruptcy for the given firm, and equity holders will 
bear these costs. Bankruptcy costs, in Barnea, Haugen and 
Senbet's view (1981b), are identical to other agency costs 
in this respect. 
It has been argued by Kim (1982) and Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1973) that bankruptcy costs are a determinant of the 
choice of corporate capital structure . The relevance of 
these costs, however, has been challenged by Warner (1977) . 
Warner, in a study of eleven railroad bankruptcies, found 
that the magnitude of the direct bankruptcy cost was insigni-
ficant. His estimate of bankruptcy costs as a fraction of 
the value of the firm three years prior to bankruptcy was 
2.5%. Immediately prior to the petition date this fraction 
was estimated to be 5.3% of the firm's value. Warner thus 
concluded that bankruptcy agency costs are not among the 
major determinants of capital structure. It is possible that 
these empirical findings have been overemphasized in the 
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literature because there were, at the time, practically no 
other empirical investigations of this matter. 
Altman (1984) has added to the empirical evidence in 
this area by estimating both direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy. His contribution is an improvement over Warner's 
study. This improvement results from using for the first 
time a proxy methodology for measuring indirect costs and 
from using a larger and less restricted sample. 
The usual argument for the significance of bankruptcy, 
as stated by Altman, is as follows: If in fact bankruptcy 
costs are significant, then the expected value of these costs 
must at some point be greater than the tax benefit derived 
from increasing leverage ; therefore, bankruptcy would be 
relevant in finding the optimal capital structure mix. 
Altman provides evidence consistent with this proposition. 
Altman assumes that markets are not perfect. He identi-
fies as direct bankruptcy costs such things as legal, accoun-
ting, filing, and other administrative costs and as indirect 
cost the loss of profits due to significant risk of bankrupt-
cy. He specifies a methodology for estimating expected pro-
fits for the period up to three years prior to the bankruptcy 
and then compares expected profits with actual profits (or 
losses) to determine the magnitude of the bankruptcy cost. 
He also clearly observes the difference between liquida-
tion and bankruptcy costs and refers to the direct and indi -
rect bankruptcy costs already mentioned . He also emphasizes 
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the fact that public awareness of a firm's financial distress 
situation and bankruptcy possibilities will have a negative 
impact on its subsequent performance . Moreover, an unexpect-
edly poor showing by a company would add to its financial 
vulnerability and could lead to bankruptcy . Altman argues 
that both series of events can and in most cases will be 
occurring at the same time. 
The measure of total value used by Altman was obtained 
by adding the market value of equity ( preferred and common ) , 
the market value of debt ( where available), the book value of 
other debt, and the capitalized value of financial leases . 
The average direct bankruptcy c o sts (BCD ) for the re-
t ailer sample of his study are simi l ar t o the figures ob-
tained by Warner . Altman found a BCD t o t otal value rat io of 
2 . 8% five years prio r t o f iling f o r bankruptcy and of 4% in 
the year o f bankruptc y, compared t o Warner's respective 
figures o f 1 . 4% and 5 . 3% . Altman ' s result f o r the industrial 
sample is somewhat larger . The av erage BCD to total value 
ratio was fairly stable f o r the entire five year period . It 
ranged from 6.2% t o 11.1% . The overall ratio , inc luding both 
groups , was 6% just prior t o bankruptcy . But this figure 
does not include indirect costs . If these costs are consid-
ered, the overall average perc entage relative to firm value 
is 12.19% ( retailers 8 . 7%, industrial 17 . 4% ) five years prior 
to bankruptcy and 16 . 7% ( retailers 12.2%, industrial 23 . 7%) 
just prior to bankruptcy . These figures , if accurate, are 
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indeed of considerable relevance for capital structure 
policy . 
In a second attempt to measure indirect coste of bank-
ruptcy, Altman uses experts' expectations of firms' profits 
for the years prior to bankruptcy and compared them with 
actual results . The sample used was composed of seven large 
bankruptcies filed between 1980 and 1982. This analysis is 
limited to indirect bankruptcy costs, mainly due to the 
availability of data constraints. The average ratio of the 
cost to value estimated for the three annual statement dates 
prior to petition filing is close to 20%. Bankruptcy was 
found to be even mo re significant on average for this sample 
of large, recently bankrupt firms than for the initial re-
tailer and industrial samples . 
Altman checks for a possible selection bias in the 
sampling of bankrupt firms, and he observed that firms with 
extreme bankruptcy probability tended to underperform what 
was expected of them, regardless of whether they went bank-
rupt or not . He emphasizes that the difference between actual 
and estimated earnings is not an unambiguous measure of 
indirect bankruptcy cost . Lower than expected earnings could 
have contributed to the filing for bankruptcy . 
Altman attempts to find some important implications for 
the continuing debate on whether there exists an optimal 
capital structure for corporations . He measured the present 
value of expected bankruptcy costs and compared it to the 
52 
present value of the expected benefits from interest payments 
on leverage. Altman concludes that if bankruptcy costs ex-
ceed tax benefi~s. the firm has too much leverage in its 
capital structure and its optimum mix of claims with respect 
to bankruptcy cost vs. tax benefits is at a lower debt to 
equity ratio . His results were that eight out of the four-
teen firms had a present value of expected bankruptcy costs 
that exceeded the present value of tax benefits from debt. 
It appears that most firms are over levered in the financial 
statement one year prior to their bankruptcy petition, re-
gardless of how the leverage factor was measured. This seems 
to be strong evidence in favo r of the relevance of bankruptcy 
costs in the capital structure . 
When bankruptcy probability inc reases, the chances o f 
reorganization rise and the managers face greater risk of 
unemployment . In this scenario, equity holders would have to 
off er the managers greater salaries to compensate for the 
greater risk they are facing. In the case of bankruptcy, 
consumers do not know how they are going to be affected by 
the reorganization, even if the firm continues as a going 
concern. The firm's sales and profits are likely to decrease, 
and new financing for profitable investment would become 
harder to obtain because debt agency costs would be very high 
at this point. 
The proportion of debt in the capital structure directly 
affects the probability of bankruptcy . By looking at the 
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c onditions under which bankruptcy occurs, i.e., when the firm 
fails to meet current payments of debt obligations, one can 
~ ~e that bankruptcy will be to some exteht affected by the 
availability of funds to fulfill the firm ' s fixed claims 
requirements and by the firm's liquidity position. In a 
recent empirical study, Walker and Petty (1978) show that 
small firms have less liquidity, as reflected by the cur rent 
ratios. Furthermo re, a problem frequently encountered by 
small firms is their sho rtage of working capital . Walker and 
Petty suggest that small firms need to economize on the use 
o f capital because o f the ir limited accesss to the capita l 
markets . This conclusion is c onsistent with Gupta ' s study 
( 1969), which shows that the c urrent and quick ratio s were 
seen to increase with the size of the firm . 
Gupta observed that smaller sized, growing cor porat ions 
e conomize in the use of available resourc es . They have a 
high invento ry turnover , high c ash velocity, l ow average 
co llection period, and high t otal asset turnover . They are 
motivaied t o economize in investment in fixed and current 
assets bec ause often , especially if they are growing, the 
investment fund requirement exc eeds the available supply. 
The fact that small firms generally exhaust all their pos-
sible s ources of liquidity financing increases their probabi-
lity of running o ut of liquid assets to cover fixed c laims 
requirements and thus increases their risk of bankruptcy . 
Gupta finds evidence that growing corporations have less 
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liquidity than non-growing ones. In our study, it is the 
growing corporations which are relevant, and the fact that 
they are ~mall and growing makes them especially inclined 
towards having a low liquidity. In a situation of financial 
distress, the probability of bankruptcy could be high for 
these firms. In the case of an unpredictable event in which 
they did not have enough liquid assets to pay their fixed 
claims, the chance of finding new sources of liquidity are 
lower for the small corporation than for the large one. For 
example, sometimes the government is willing to assist large 
corporations in the event of bankruptcy due to the impact 
that such a bankruptcy would have on the economy. The trou-
bles of a single small corporation, on the other hand, cannot 
worry the federal government. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) have studied the incentive 
effect of the threat of bankruptcy on the quality of manage-
ment of a widely held corporation. They argue that manage-
ment can use debt as a bonding activity to precommit itself 
in such a way that managers can avoid loosing their jobs only 
by being more productive . They also maintain that managers 
of firms that are mainly or solely equity financed do not 
have a strong interest to maximize profits, assuming that 
they have no ownership interest in the firm, because they do 
not feel the threat of debt. Such a firm's low profits would 
be reflected in its low value on the stock market. Bankrupt-
cy is seen by Grossman and Hart as a factor encouraging 
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managers to behave as profit maximizers . If managers do not 
seek high profits, the probability that the corporation will 
go bankrupt increases. Managers prefer to pursue profit 
rather than risking sacrificing the perquisites and benefits 
they obtain from the firm. 
For our analysis, the difference between the owner-man-
ager of a small firm and the manager of a widely diversified 
corporation is important. One can assume that the owner-
manager has control power which decreases as the firm grows 
and as his or her ownership fraction decreases. With this in 
mind it would seem that Grossman and Hart's analysis would 
not apply f o r a manager that is the sole owne r of an all 
equity financed firm nor would it apply for an owner-manager 
that still has control power . Even though he also enjoys 
perk consumption, the owner-manager will seek to maximize the 
value of the shares. Due t o his ownership interest, he and 
other shareholders will receive full benefit from any in-
c rease in profits, except in bankruptcy states. This analy-
sis is in agreement with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) view. 
It follows that Grossman and Hart's theory will only 
apply to large corporations whose managers have no ownership 
interes t in the firm . In this case, the manager would not 
directly benefit from an increase in profits . A switch from 
equity financing t o debt financing involves an incentive 
strategy because managers feel an incentive to avoid bank-
ruptcy. This bonding on the part of the managers helps mini-
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mize the equity agency costs of large corporations. It sup-
ports Barnea, Haugen and Senbet's (1981a) assessment that 
for large corporations equity agency costs are negligible. 
Bonding on the part of the managers is a particular case 
in which management reduces the agency costs related to 
equity by favoring a capital structure with debt . It is 
interesting to note that this happens because of the fear of 
bankruptcy on the part of the manager . This potential loss 
of his benefits is one of many possible incentive schemes 
which can lead to a good managerial behavior. The control 
over information possessed by management is endangered by the 
probability o f bankruptcy. This positive characteristic of 
this particular incentive scheme is not a component of the 
salary incentive schemes analyzed by Fama, but it would be 
present in a corporate charter which permits and to some 
extent encouraged takeover bids. Then, i f the corporation is 
poorly managed, an investor can make profits by buying the 
company at a low price, reorganizing it, and selling it at a 
higher price . This again can only happen in large corpora-
tions and is another method of minimizing the agency costs of 
large corporations . 
In the Grossman and Hart (1980) model, the agency rela-
tionship exists because the shareholders are not able to 
observe the investment decisions of the management. The 
problem can be solved, benefitting both managers and share-
holders, if the manager makes his reward conditioned on the 
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future value o f the firm . Fo r him t o have a positive r e ward , 
the value of the firm has t o be greater than the debt pay-
~~nts . He will, therefore, act in a profit maximizing man-
ner , and this, in turn, would have a counter effect o n the 
increased probability o f bankruptcy due to an inc rease in the 
level o f debt . 
To explain the debt to equity ratio, Ross ( 1977 ) devel -
o ps a signaling model whic h is also related to managerial 
incentives and the probability of bankruptcy . His analysis 
assumes that the firms have some exogeno us qualities known by 
t he man agement but n o t by the market . The purpose of his 
paper is to see the capita l structure o f the firm as a sig-
naling mechanism. His theo ry predicts t hat there is a di rect 
r elationshi p between a firm's debt to equity ratio and its 
market value . This is because i n c reas i ng leverage i nc r eases 
the market's pe r c eption of value. Ross proves t hat a l o w 
quality firm will not try t o s i gna l that it is of high quali-
ty through the issuance o f debt because the risk and cost of 
a high probability of bankruptcy is too high . 
The difference between Ros s ' and Hart and Grossman ' s 
approa c h is that one is a b o nd i ng s c heme and the othe r is a 
signaling s c heme . Ross tries to explain how the level of 
debt in a firm is. used by the market as a signal o f the value 
o f the f i rm , where high levels o f deb t imply high value . 
Hart and Grossman analyze how managers and stockholders bene-
fit from having debt in their capital structure. Both analy -
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ses look at the probability of bankruptcy as the key incen-
tive for mangers to act in the interest of the shareholders . 
In this sense, debt reduces equity agency costs for large 
corporations. 
Both arguments also suggest that the behavior of manage -
ment in the presence o f debt and the probability of bankrupt-
cy that comes with the debt minimizes bankruptcy aaenc y 
costs. It is in the interest of managers of large corpora-
tions to try to avoid bankruptcy, so it is in their interest 
to keep debt under control and at an optimal level . 
Owner- managers wil l have other incentives underlying 
their behavior . It is rational for them to issue large a-
mounts of debt. They prefer high risk, and they have less 
fear of bankruptcy because they have the possibility of being 
rewarded by high return . 
The tax shelter bankruptcy cost ( TS-BC) theory of opti-
mal capital structure determines a firm's optimal leverage as 
a function of the distribution of future earnings, business 
risk, default costs, and taxes . Castanias (1 983) analyzes a 
cross sectional prediction of the tax shelter bankruptcy cost 
hypothesis. He argues that a shift in the distribution of 
earnings that increases the probability of bankruptcy will 
induce a firm to decrease the debt to equity ratio in its 
capital structure . Castanias tries to prove that there is an 
inverse cross sectional relationship between probability of 
bankruptcy and leverage rather than between business risk and 
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leverage, as has been assumed in previous studies. He esti-
mates this relationship and he uses the results to test the 
Miller irrelevance hypothesis and the TS-BC hypothesis . 
Castanias favors his method of cross sectional tests of 
the TS-BC over the direct market value test because cross 
sectional tests are not confounded by ambiguous announcements 
and wealth transfer effects and because cross sectional tests 
u sually focus on the risk- l everage relationship implied by 
the TS-BC model . The data used by Castanias represent a 
large sample o f firms , inc l uding many small firms and firms 
that are n ot publicly traded . 
He finds that tests based on samples of very large f i rms 
are less likely to find a negative relationship between the 
probabil i ty of bankruptcy and leve rage since the marginal 
bankruptc y c osts f o r l arge fi rms inc r e ase less rapidly than 
those f o r smaller f i rms . Myers has suggested that margi nal 
bankruptc y costs will be lower fo r large firms than f o r small 
f i rms due t o the lower manage r i a l re l ated agency c osts and to 
fewer growth opportunities . 
Castanias believes that past relative failure rates 
wo uld be a good indic ato r o f whic h lines of business have 
relatively high expected future failure rates, assuming that 
relative failure rates are stationary over time and that line 
o f business failure rates are good predictors of the proba-
bility of failure of individual firms i n that line of busi -
ness. He applied the Kendall coefficient of concordance to 
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each pair of years of his sample (1940 - 70; 1972-77) and found 
that in fact, relative failure rates are rank stationary by 
business line for the period covered by the sample. He 
tested the hypothesis that business-line historical failure 
rates provide information about the risk of individual firms 
if failure rates differ significantly across business lines. 
The hypothesis was not rejected at the 0.01 significance 
level . He, therefore, concluded that failure rates contain 
information concerning expected future probability of default 
and can be used as surrogates for them . 
Total assets as a measure of firm size may be related 
indirectly to the business risk or bankruptcy cost of the 
firm . Castanias argues that given the TS-BC hypothesis, the 
average firm size of a line of business is directly related 
to line of business failure rates for the following resons : 
1) Larger firms have less business risk per dollar of assets 
invested or per dollar of expected earnings because they 
might be more diversified and have a lower variance of ear-
nings . 2) Larger firms have borrowing markets more accept -
able to them . 3 ) Larger firms may have a greater marginal 
tax rate and thereby more tax offset per dollar of assets . 
4) Large firms have lower costs of default per dollar of 
assets, debt, or expected returns . 
According to Castanias : 
To the extent that firm size is a surrogate for 
cross sectional variation in business risk or default 
costs, its correlation with historical failure rates 
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should be negative. However, firm eize might also be a 
surrogate for difference in tax off sets or in access to 
debt markets across industries, in which case its cor-
relation with business failure rate eeries is ambiguous 
(1983, p.1625). 
He found that the correlation coefficient between total 
assets and failure rates is negative and significant. The 
probability of failure is , therefore, higher for those lines 
of business in which firms are smaller on the average . The 
TS-BC model suggests that this may lead to higher debt to 
equity ratios for larger firms. It follows that to the 
extent that larger firm size is a surrogate for lower busi-
ness risk or l ower bankruptcy costs, the significant negative 
correlation between firm size and failure rates refutes the 
Miller irrelevance hypothesis and is consistent with the TS-
BC hypothesis. 
The empirical results of Castanias' study are cons istent 
with a variant of the TS - BC model in which firms in lines o f 
business that tend to have high failure rates also tend t o 
have less debt in their capital stucture. They are not, 
however , cons istent with Miller's irrelevance hypothesis. 
The results are consistent with the theory that ex- ante 
default costs are large enough to induce the typical firm to 
hold an optimum mix of debt and equity. Further resear ch may 
well corroborate the hypothesis that for smaller firms de-
fault costs and business risk are important factors affecting 
optimal leverage levels . 
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D. Summary of Chapter Two 
A brief summary of this chapter will be helpful to 
emphasize the most important findings of how agency costs 
affect large and small firms differently. 
With respect to equity agency costs, they arise when the 
prices of the shares are negatively affected by the behavior 
of the manager. It was observed that small corporations 
characterized by an owner-manager face equity agency costs 
of considerable magnitude. These agency costs arise mainly 
from the incentive of this owner-manager, who has control 
power, to maximize his utility at the expenses of outside 
security holders. Large corporations with diversified owner-
ship, on the other hand, are characterized by managers who 
are disciplined by the labor market to behave in a manner 
that will maximize the security holders' wealth. These mana-
gers will keep the consumption of "perks " and incompetent 
behavior to a minimum in order to maintain their job and 
reputation. 
Another equity agency problem is the one related to risk 
incentives. If the manager's attitude is one of risk aver-
sion this will have a negative effect on the price of the 
stock, since according to the option pricing view of equity, 
the higher the risk, the higher the value of the stock. For 
small firms we assumed that the manager is also an owner and , 
therefore, wil/ have an incentive to undertake risky pro-
jects. But managers of large corporations tend to be risk 
63 
averse since the majority of their wealth is represented by 
the service rendered to the firm, and their wealth would be 
at stake if the corporation enters a troubled situation. 
This equity agency cost is neutralized to a great extent by 
the labor market, monitoring and bonding activities and by 
other agency costs. 
Asymmetry of information arises when the manager cannot 
disclose the value of a particular project or investment 
costlessly to investors . This asymmetry of information has 
a negative effect on the price of the security issued for 
financing, whether the issue is debt o r equity . But accor-
ding to Myers ( 1984 ) the firm would face higher agency costs, 
in general, if it decides t o finance with equity as opposed 
to debt. Morover, the higher the risk of existing debt, 
i . e ., the higher the probability o f default, the greater the 
informatio n o f asymmetry agency cost of issuing debt. I f , 
for example, we believe that small firms have greater risk 
than large firms, then this particular agency cost would also 
be greater for small firms . 
The debt agency costs related t o the incentive to under-
take high risk, low value projects , refers to the behavior of 
the manager of a levered firm . If the manager undertakes 
risky projects , he will benefit shareholders at the expense 
of bondholders. An owner-manager of a small corporation is 
less risk averse than the one of large corporation and, 
therefore, small firms will face relatively higher agency 
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coete of debt of this particular type. 
The agency costs associated with stock.holders' incentive 
to forgo profitable investments arise with the issuance of 
debt. These costs as Myers (1977) noted, are affected by the 
growth opportunity component of the total value of the firm. 
The probability of these investment options not being exer-
ci sed by the shareholders , depends mainly on the maturity 
structure of the debt . We found that in general the relative 
magnitude of these agency costs is indeterminate. That is, 
without knowing the particular situation we cannot tell a 
priori the relative magnitude ( small firm versus large firm ) 
o f these costs . 
Liquidation age ncy costs may be v i ewed as a debt-agency 
cost that appears to have an adverse effec t o n small firms 
producing consumer durables. Liquidation agenc y costs would 
probably pro duce a weak effect in the small firm debt market . 
This weak effect, however, would still be greater than the 
e ffect of these agency costs in the large firm debt market. 
Finally, bankruptcy agency costs clearly affect small 
fi rms to a greater extent t han large firms. Thus, the debt 
agency costs arising from bankruptcy are higher f o r small 
firms , relative to the value of the firm . 
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III. YIJ:LD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DIIUR&NTIALS BITWDN 
LARGE AND SHALL J'IRHS: A PARTIAL GDmAL EQUILIBRIUM t«>DKL 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the size of 
the corporation is an important determinant of the supply and 
demand curves of corporate debt . This analysis will be made 
u sing the framework used by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 
( 1981a), modified to take firm size into account. In their 
work, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet generalize the analysis made 
by Miller (1977), which can be summarized as follows: Hiller 
analyzes the notion of tax-induced differential returns on 
securities in a general equilibrium framework. This differ-
ential return arises because an investo r in a higher tax 
bracket will demand a higher rate of return on investment in 
o rder to compensate for the greater tax burden incurred . On 
the other hand, firms wil l supply debt so long as the person-
al tax-induced compensation is less than the tax saving from 
interest payment deductions at the corporate level. As a 
consequence, the corporate tax subsidy dissappears and cor-
po rate leverage is irrelevant to the value o f any particular 
firm. In equilibrium , there is only an optimal debt level 
for the corporate sector as a whole . 
The generalization of this argument made by Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet (198la) consists of : 1) modification of the 
demand curve for corporate debt by introducing costs asso-
ciated with tax avoidance and 2) modification of the supply 
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curve to take into account agency costs associated with 
corporate debt financing . This generalization leads the au-
thors to conclude that an equilibrium will be reached where 
the capital structure of any firm is consequential to its 
market value and, in addition , that agency costs of debt are 
shifted to bond holders in the form of lower interest rates. 
Hiller ' s work , as well as the generalization by Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet, are based on the following assumptions: 1) 
progress ive personal tax rates; 2) no tax arbitrage by indi-
viduals and firms ( relaxed by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ); 3) 
a personal tax rate differential in favor of income from 
stocks; 4) the opportunity for riskless borrowing and lending 
(also relaxed by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ). 
To extend the analysis to include the size of the corpo-
ration, it is necessary to subdivide the market into differ-
ent groups with respect to size. We will analyze only two 
extreme groups, one composed of small corporat ions and the 
other composed of large corporations. 
To be consistent with previous chapters, we emphasize 
that the most important characteristic which differentiates 
small and large corporations is the ownership structure. 
Small corporations are identifiable as having a manager who 
owns enough shares to maintain control of the company while 
large corporations are characterized by diversified ownership 
and a separation of ownership and control. 
Note also that throughout the analysis in previous chap-
67 
ters we were concerned with relative agency costs instead of 
absolute agenc y costs and with debt to value ratios instead 
o f t otal levels of debt . Since Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 
develop their equilibrium model based on t o tal l evels of 
debt, s ome adjustments are called f o r in order to convert the 
analysis to relative and not absolute terms so that agency 
costs o f small and large corporati ons c an be compared in a 
meaningful way . What is important for the corporat ion when 
ch oosing i ts optimal c apital structure is the percentage by 
whic h the value o f the firm is reduced due to agenc y costs 
and not the absolute value o f these costs. 
Section A, Part 1 o f this c hapter considers the implica-
tions of Miller ' s analysis. Part 2 focuses on the impl ica-
tions o f Barnea , Haugen and Senbet's introductio n of a tax 
avo idance function and an agency cost function . Se c ti on B 
extends the ea r lie r a nalyses by introduc ing equity agency 
costs, and analyzing effects of these on equilibrium inter-
est r ates and the c apital structure of large and sma ll firms . 
A. Hiller ' s Model and Generalization 
1 . Implications of Mi ller's model 
Mi lle r ( 1977) differentiates between perso nal taxation 
on investment income from stock and from b onds. Tps and Tpb 
denote perso nal tax rates on income from s tock and bonds 
respec tively . In Miller's model with personal taxes , t he 
after-tax returns t o the investor o f a levered firm with a 
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given investment strategy are : 
XL = X ( 1-Tc) (1-Tps) + rD[l - Tpb - ( 1-Tc) ( l-Tps)] ( 1 ) 
where : X = random earnings before interest and taxes 
r = interest rate on taxable but riskless corporate 
bonds sold at par 
D = ~ar value of consol bonds (since the analysis is 
carried out in a perpetual framework ) 
Tc = corporate income tax rate 
The vpluation equation is o btained by invoking the 
value additivity princ iple to discount the earnings in ( 1 ). 
The modified tax- adjusted valuatio n model may be wri tten as : 
VL = Vu + D (1- ( l - Tc)( l - Tps ) / ( 1-Tpb ) ] 
Where: Vu = value of the unlevered but otherwise identic al 
firm . 
( 2 ) 
The secon·d term represents what Hiller c alls the gain 
from leverage. Miller , i n his analysis, assumes progressive 
t axation whic h is exogenously determined. He shows why the 
gain from leverage must be zero in equilibrium, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. This equilibrium is obtained when Tc = Tpb at 
the margin, with the assumption that Tps = 0. Since Miller 
does no t allow tax arbitrage in his framework, he obtains an 
upward sloping demand curve rd (D). The intercept o f t he 
demand curve represents the tax exempt equivalent of the pure 
rate o f interest . All tax exempt securities yield certainty 
equivalent returns equal t o r* in Hiller's world . These 
securities include equity, whi c h i s assumed t o be tax exempt . 
Rate of 
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Figure 3 . 1 . The Miller Bo nd Market Equilibrium 
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The horizontal part of the demand curve represents the demand 
for tax exempt securities . 
On the demand side, an investor with the marginal tax 
rate Tpb will buy a taxable security, as o pposed to a tax 
exempt one, only if bonds offer at least r = r*/( 1-Tpb) . 
Therefore, to issue additional debt the corporation must pay 
higher interest rates . On the supply side, firms will only 
is sue bonds as long as the marginal tax saving rTc is more 
than r-r*.' The supply curve is horizontal at r = r* / (1-Tc ) 
because corporations are assumed to be wealth maximizers and 
because Miller assumes a corporate tax rate which is uniform 
across al l c orporations . This implies that interest rates 
below r = r* / (1 - Tc ) will induce firms t o seek debt financing , 
whereas interest rates greater than r* / (1-Tc) will eliminate 
debt as an alternatlve way of cor.porate financing . Equilib-
rium in th~ c o rpo rate debt market occurs where the supply 
c urve intersec ts the demand curve and the equilibrium yie l d 
is given by r = r* / (1 - Tc). The mo st striking implication of 
this equilibrium is that at this yield individual firms are 
indifferent between issuing debt o r equity to finance their 
i nvestments, even though an optimal aggregate level o f co rpo-
rate debt D* is determined . 
2. Implications o f Barnea, Haugen and Senbet's generalization 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981a) include costly tax 
arbitr age in their analysis. If arbitrage were costless, 
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investors would be able to completely eliminate the disadvan-
tage of taxable investment income . In Figure 3.2, costless 
tax arbitrage is reflected by a perfectly elastic demand 
curve for corporate debt at the rate r* . As a result of its 
lower cost, debt becomes a dominant financial instrument . 
. 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, therefore, assume that investment 
strategies which save taxes exist but are costly to 
investors. 
These.tax-avoidance costs are taken into account in 
investors' portfolio optimization and are assumed to be an 
increasing function of the amount o f tax sheltered income 
utilized by the investor . Barnea , Haugen and Senbet justify 
this assumption by arguing that the utilization of tax shel-
ters results in investors deviating fro m their utility-maxi-
mizing consumption and portfolio decisions . The loss in pre-
tax utility o btained by comparing investor po rtfolio cho ices 
without taxes to investo r choices with personal taxes mea-
sures the implicit cost of tax avoidanc e . The explicit costs 
include the c osts of financial intermediation and short sel-
ling. Additionally, the tax code may prohibit the excessive 
use of a particular tax shelter . As a result of these fac-
tors, the authors argue that the marginal cost of tax avoi-
dance is an increas ing function of the amount of income 
sheltered. 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet note that increasing costs of 
tax avoidance at the margin are sufficient to generate the 
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upward sloping demand curve UYV in Fig . 3.2. This demand 
curve is more elastic than the upward portion of Miller's 
demand curve. In their analysis, however, the demand curve 
represents increasing aggregate demand by all investor s in 
different tax brackets induced by the increasing differential 
in yield o n corporate bonds over tax exempt secur ities. The 
majo r effect o f introducing costly tax avoidance is to intro-
duce equilibrium differential returns on securities o f dif -
ferent tax status, which is consistent with empirical obser-
vation. 
The existence of agency problems presupposes that debt 
instruments are risk bearing. Therefore, the bond yield is 
adjusted to its certainty equivalent value using the unique 
market price of risk. This adjustment of b o nd yields allows 
the comparison of perfect substitutes in Figure 3.2. 
I t is necessary, before continuing , t o mention that the 
authors assume that agency costs of equity are negligible. 
They, therefore, deal only with debt agency costs. The 
implications of this assumption are dealt with in detail in 
section B, " Large and Small Firm Differ ences in the Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet Equilibrium." 
Using the debt agency cost arguments outlined in Chapter 
Two, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981a) establish that agency 
costs of debt are an increasing function of the amount of 
debt employed by a firm. (They assume the agenc y cost func-
tio n to be linear.) Thus, given an investment o ppo rtunity 
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set o f the firm, any increase in the amount af debt wil l 
increase the size of the agency costs incurred by the cor -
poration . They incorpo rate the agency costs of debt by 
modifying the supply curve of co rpo r ate debt. With agenc y 
costs, the supply curve is no longer ho rizontal. Rather the 
supply c urve must fall with higher levels o f debt t o compen-
sate firms f o r the additional agenc y costs incurre d . The 
downward sloping supply c urve XY Z i n figure 3 .2 r eflects this 
adjustment ~ for agenc y costs. 
Corporations will be encouraged to use debt if the sum 
o f the rate of interes t on corpo r ate bonds and the diff eren -
tial agenc y costs as a percent of marginal debt financed is 
a t most e qual to r* /( 1 - Tc). Othe rwise, debt f inancing is 
dominated by e quity financing . The i ndivi dual firm wil l have 
an incenti ve to issue debt to the point where the differen-
tial agency costs o f debt financ ing, 6 11: (D) a re equal t o e* 
f o r the marginal unit of debt. r is associated with a finite 
a ggregate supply of debt across a l l fi rms. As the interest 
rate falls, firms will increase the optimal amount of debt in 
their c apital struc ture. 
Equilibrium will be reac hed whe r e the demand and supply 
curves intersect. Barnea, Haugen and Senbet conclude that 
there is an equilibrium quantity of bonds outstanding in the 
corporate secto r D***, that the agency costs o f debt are 
shifted to bondholders, and that there is an optimal c apital 
structure suc h that individual firms supply debt until 
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* r* /( 1 - Tc ) - r (D***) = e .. (DI() = 0 D*** = 0 . The final inci-
d ence o f agency c o sts in their framework will be determined 
by the elasti c ities and c r os s-e lasticities o f the demand and 
supply c urves of corporate debt, tax exempt debt and corporate 
equity . They assert, though, that the equilibrium rate on 
corporate bo nds wi ll always be between r* and r* /( 1-Tc). 
As noted above, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981a) as -
sume the agency costs of equity to be negligible . They cite 
Fama's wo rk ( 1980) as a justificatio n for this assumption . 
Fama argues that under widely diversified ownership the labo r 
market disciplines mana gers ' behavior. But t o say that the 
market is compo sed solely o f large corpo rations with diver-
sified ownership is to o verlook the large number of small 
corpo ratio ns that he lp make up t he economic syste m. 
Based o n o ur previous discuss ion o f debt and equity 
a gency costs, we no w graph the agency cos t fun c tion f o r a 
representative small and large firm . I n Fig . 3.3, size is 
treated a s a parameter, i.e . , size is constant for a given 
set of curves, with small firms deno ted by " s " and large 
firms denoted by " l " . Fo r eac h size group, t he agency cost 
o f de bt ( ACD ) and the agency cost o f outside equity ( ACE) are 
summed f o r each leverage ratio to obtain the total agency 
cost functi o n ( TAC) . 
We provisio nally assume that the purpose of the firm, 
given its investment o pportunity set, is to minimize the 
agency costs arising from their financing decisions . We also 
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assume that both the large and small corpo ration represented 
in Figure 3.3 h a ve the same fract i o n o f internal equity 
( whi c h is held constant and is no t sho wn in the graph ). 
For a given size , the f ollowing relationships are ob-
tained: 
a) a ACE < 0 
a D/ Total Value As equity is replaced by d ebt, ACE 
decreases (s ince the i ncentive to consume excessive perqui-
sites dec r eases). 
b) a ACD > O 
a D/ Total Value As the r atio o f debt t o total value 
increases ACD increase s (due to bankruptcy, asymmet r y o f 
informati on, etc .) 
This gra ph shows that s ize is an impo rtant dete rmini ng 
par a mete r o f capital st r uc ture when the object ive o f a fi r m 
is to minimize agency cost s. The graph implies that the debt 
to t o tal value ratio is larger f o r small corpo ratio ns than 
fo r large ones . 
It is impor tant t o e mphasize that the dif ference in 
relative agency costs o f equity between small corpo ratio ns 
and large corpo rations is of considerable magnitude . The ACE 
are conside r ed negligible f o r large corpo rations but very 
r elevant in the financial decisions o f s ma ll corpo rations. 
Relative agency costs o f debt are also conside r ed to be 
s mal ler f o r large corpo rat ions than fo r small ones, but it is 
no t po ss ible t o inf er how la rge the diffe r ence between ACD 
fo r l arge and smal l corporatio ns is. Regardl ess o f the mag-
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nitude of this difference, however, the difference in equity 
agency costs is large enough so that the minimum po int in the 
TAC c urve, i.e., the optimal ratio o f debt to t otal value, 
for small corporations lies to the right of the minimum point 
of the TAC f o r large corporations. Based on agency cost 
relatio nships , small firms have an incentive to inc rease 
leverage beyond the leverage c hosen by their large firm 
counterpa rts. The fact that small firms do i ndeed have a debt 
to total value rati o greater than that for large corpo rati on s 
will be d iscus sed in Chapter Four . 
If the a ssumpti on o f negligible agency costs of e quity 
is indeed justif ied f o r large corporations, then we wou ld 
e xpect to fi nd large corporations wi t h the objective o f 
mi nimizing agency costs t o be financed almost entirely by 
equity . At the extreme whe n ACE = 0 , the g raph representing 
agenc y costs would be depicted a s in Figure 3 . 4 . Here , the 
TAC c urve is upward sloping and does no t have a min i mum that 
wo uld determine an o ptimal debt to t otal v alue ratio exc lu-
sively fr om an agenc y cost analys is. This is the type o f 
graph used by Barnea, Haugen and Senbe t in their analysis. 
Of course firms do not simply try to minimize agency 
costs , but rather, given an investment opportunity s et, they 
try to minimize the total financing related costs including 
agenc y costs , flotation costs, and the like , while also 
taking into account tax subsidies and tax deductions. Stil l, 
this preliminary analysis has allowed us to see some iso lated 
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implications of agency costs on the capita l structure . 
B. Large and Small Firm Differences 
in the Barnea,. Haugen and Senbet Equilibrium 
To incorporate these factors into the partial equilib-
rium framework used by Hiller (1977) and by Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet (1981a ) , we first separate the market into a 
group composed of small corporations and a group composed of 
large corporations . Therefore, we will be dealing with an 
aggregate supply and demand for small and large corporations 
respectively . To do this, we take a particular small corpor -
ation as representative of the group and then we aggregate 
over this part of the market. The same process is applied to 
large corporations. We will deal only with these two groups 
in o rder to emphasize the major differences but, we are, of 
course, aware that there is a continuum o f firm sizes . 
Next we intr oduce the agency costs of equity in the 
partial equilibrium framework of Hiller and Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet. Recall that Miller as well as Barnea, Haugen 
and Senbet, take r * to be the yield of tax exempt securities, 
including equity. In fact, r* is the only parameter i n the 
graph that is directly related to equity. r* may be thought 
of as the risk adjusted return on equity for large corpora-
tions. No adjustment is needed for equity agency costs 
(ACE(l)) , since they have been assumed to be negligible. To 
incorporate the equity agency costs for small corporations, 
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we note that investors require a higher rate of return on 
equity from small co rpo rati ons to compensate fo r the higher 
ACE( s) . If so, then r*s will be greater than r*l by a ce r-
tain premium denoted ~ . The size of 4 is a function of 
the size of the corpo ration , the debt to total value ratio , 
and the fl otation costs, i . e., 
6 = f (S, D/V, F) 
The sign of ~ 6 I a S depends on the size range, as dis-
c ussed in Chapter Two . This derivative i s greater than zero 
when the owner of the majority of shares is also the manager 
and, therefore, possesses control . But as the percentage o f 
his shares decreases, the manager is subject to the competi-
tion in the labo r market and i 6 / a S becomes les s tha n zero . 
Since we a r e dealing with the aggregation o f small and 
large corpor ations of a particular give n size, r espectively, 
size is again a paramete r . With the size given, flot a tion 
costs are determined, assuming debt issues a r e p r oportional 
to firm size . Therefore, the only factor that can affect the 
magnitude of 6, given firm size , is the debt to total v a lue 
ratio (D/V). 
Figu re 3.5 presents a graph which shows the risk adjus-
ted required equity-equivalent rate, r , for a representative 
small firm . Here, d is the sum of a fixed component which 
depends o n size and flotation costs and a variable component 
which depends o n the debt to total value rati o. 4 is at a 
maximum when the smal l corpo ration's outside financing con-
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sists solely of equity and declines continuously as the pro-
po rtion of debt increases, reaching a minimum when D/ V = 1 . 0 . 
A = -Y - ( A (D)) 
To move from the representative firm to the market, we 
aggregate over all firms in the the group . That is, we sum 
horizontally across debt levels at each interest rate r . The 
results o f this effort are shown in Figure 3.6 . 
In Figure 3 . 6, D* represents the level ·of the debt if 
all small c o rporations are 100% levered . The advantage o f 
incorporating equity agency costs in thi s way is that we have 
a corresponding po int of reference of t he debt to total value 
ratio in the general partial equilibrium framewo rk , which is 
nec essa ry for this analysi s. 
The distance between r* /( 1-Tc)-r* is determined by Tc . 
We assume here that all corpo rations are subject to the same 
c o rporate tax rate . After t aking into a ccount equity agency 
costs, the relevant equity equivalent rate is r * +A and the 
debt rate is ( r* +A )/( 1-Tc). 
As the firm starts replacing outside equity f or debt, 
the alternative costs of equity and debt are: 
( r* + fl ) VS . ( r* +.4 ) 
1 - Tc 
The supply curve for corporate debt is not infinitely elastic 
for small corporations while it is for large ones . The 
supply curve is negatively sloped for small firms, and its 
slope depends on how responsive equity agency costs are when 
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outside equity is replaced by debt. 
Debt agency costs are assumed to be an increasing func-
tion of debt . As Barnea, Haugen and Senbet have noted, the 
supply curve must refiect these additional costs, and there-
fore, the supply curve is downward sloping. Figure 3.7 shows 
the supply curve as well as the demand curve for debt of 
small corporations . In Figure 3.7 we take as valid Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet's argument that costly tax arbitrage is one 
of the primary determinants of the slope of the demand curve. 
Due to the segmentation of the market into small and 
large corporations, it is necessary to make some modifica-
tions of this tax arbitrage argument . Barnea, Haugen and 
Senbet argue that the demand curve f o r c o rporate debt is 
upward sloping because of the increasing cost of tax avoi-
dance . In their analysis, they consider the total level of 
corporate debt. In this analysis, however, we have consi-
dered small and large corporations separately, so it would be 
incorrect t o use the same, or even two upward sloping curves, 
for small and large corporations . As previously noted, small 
corporations have a smaller share of the market than large 
ones, and thus the costly tax arbitrage function could affect 
the demand curve for small corporations less than the demand 
curve for large corporations. To avoid this potential prob-
lem, it will be the assumed that the marginal tax avoidance 
cost is determined solely by the demand c urve for corporate 
debt for large firms when the market is in equilibrium. The 
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rate determi n ed at equilibrium can then be used f o r the s mall 
firm's demand as a pro xy f o r the c o sts of tax arbitrage. The 
justificatio n f o r this treatment is that the debt issued by 
large firms do minates the t otal debt market , and there is no 
special reason why the costs of tax arbitrage should be 
different for smal l and l arge firms . 
In Fig . 3 .7 , AB wo ul d be the costly tax arbitrage f o r 
the marginal unit o f debt , dete r mined by the intersec tio n of 
the demand ,and supply of corpo r ate debt f o r large firms . The 
demand c urve f o r debt o f small corpo rati ons is shifted upward 
by the distanc e AB t o r e fle c t the effec t of cost l y tax arbi -
trage o n small f i rm demand. 
For large c orporati ons, the same aggre gative pro cess is 
applied s o we have a finite amo unt o f deb t , Dl max, corres -
ponding t o the s ituatio n where all large co r porati ons are 
financed by debt ( also in Figure 3. 7 ). 
To emphasize the interest rate diff e rential bet ween l arge 
and small firms, we c an think ho w a l e nde r o r supplier of 
capital ( demand side o f this graph) reac ts when fac e d with 
t wo different alternatives . For example , he can buy a bo nd 
from a large corpo rat i on with 80% debt t o t otal value rat io 
o r he c an buy o ne fro m a comparable small corporatio n with 
the same ratio. All previous analyses lead us t o c o n c lude 
that relative agency c ost for s mall c orporations are larger 
than those f o r large corporations. This would mean that if 
large and small corporation s have the same financial lever -
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age, the supply curve, which has debt agency costs incorpo-
rated, would be always lower for large corpo rati ons than for 
small co rporations, i . e., 0os > 0 0~ , as shown i n Figure 3 . 8. 
Therefo re, the marginal agency costs of debt f o r small and 
large corporations are different at all points, assuming the 
same debt to total value ratio. Rec all that the demand cu rve 
for small firms , but no t f o r large ones, is affected by 
equity agency costs . Total demand is the sum of the curve 
r* + ~ plus the cost o f tax arbitrage . This demand curve f or 
small corporations lies above the demand curve for la rge 
corpo rat i o ns througho ut the range . In F i gure 3 . 8, the equi-
librium for eac h grou p occurs where the demand c r osses the 
supply f o r corporate debt . 
The implicati o n o f these equilibria is that the equilib -
rium inte r est rate f o r c orporate de bt f o r small c o rporations 
is higher than equilibrium corpora~e debt f o r large corpo ra -
tio ns . This conclusio n is supported empiric ally , as will be 
documented in Chapte r Four. Mo reover, a n equilibrium agency 
cost as a perc entage of marg i nal debt financed and an equi-
librium level o f c o rporate debt for eac h size group are 
determined. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the composit i o n of agency c osts 
in the small firm sec tor. 0d represents debt agency c o sts, 
e. represents equity agency c osts, and 6t is the sum o f 0d 
and 6c . This equilibr ium analysis f o r t he aggregate market 
takes into account not only a gency costs but also flotation 
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costs and tax subsidies, whi ch were considered in this analy-
sis t0 be the major fact o rs affecting the financial deci-
sions. ( The availability o f tax deductions, among othe r 
things, can also affect this decision, but it is not consid-
ered here. ) 
To link the results of the aggregate market and individ-
ual firm decisions , assume for a moment that we have all the 
agency costs on the demand side . This will have an impact on 
the equilibrium interest r ate, but we are interested in the 
net equilibrium interest rate , after agency costs are sub-
trac ted. The net interest rate is the same regardless of 
whethe r agenc y costs are a ccounted f o r in the supply o r 
demand c urve. If all agenc y costs a re accounted f o r in the 
demand side, Figure 3.9 allo ws us to obtain some additional 
implications conce rning c apital struc ture . 
Fig. 3.10 iso lates the agency costs and flotation costs 
which are included in~ from all o ther factors . As drawn, 
the aggregate demand c urve which has all agency costs incor-
porated does have a minimum point . This minimum point cor-
responds t o the minimum point f o r an i ndividual firm whose 
goal is to minimize the agency costs . But as shown in Figure 
3.9, this p o int , D*, does n ot correspo nd t o the equilibrium 
po int . The tax advantage of debt implies a rate differential 
of r* + 6 - (r*+ 6 ) / (1-Tc), which determ i nes the intercept of 
the supply curve. The supply curve has a negative slope , 
since decreases as debt increases. The equilibrium interest 
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rate occurs where the demand and the supply curve intersect . 
This equilibrium occurs to the right of the minimum point o f 
the demand curve, implying a high level o f aggregate debt . 
When this result is carried over t o individual firms, it 
implies a level of debt to the right of the minimum point o f 
total agency costs , as sho wn in Fig. 3 . 11 . This occ urs 
becaus e firms will ad j ust their c apital structures , replacing 
equity for debt or debt f o r equity unti 1 the.ir 0" = 0 * At 
\ 
this po int firms are able to take maximum advantage of the 
tax subsidy o f leverage, while taking into account the aggre-
gate agenc y costs. 
This impl icati o n that small firms a re mo re high l y le-
vered is , as menti o ne d earlier , in agre ement wi t h the r a sul ts 
of empirical researc h. When the factor o f costly tax arb i -
trage i s taken into a ccount , the e qu i librium level o f debt 
decreases, as sho wn in Figure 3.9. However, thi s e qui librium 
is still larger than the one implie d by the minimizatio n o f 
agency c o sts . 
For large corpo rations , assuming that equity agency 
.. c o sts are zero and given that al is less than 0s , the graph-
ical representatio n would b e as sho wn in Figure 3 . 1 2. , Th i s 
graph implies that comparing marginal agenc y costs, large 
firms would be less lev~red than small firms . 
The issue of agency inc idenc e, i . e ., who bears these 
agency c osts, will be considered next . In the general equi -
librium one could say , as Barnea, Haugen and Senbet have 
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argued, that f o r large firms , bondholders bear the differen-
tial agency costs . Firms with fewer agency costs cou ld 
· extrac t rent and would be able to employ higher leverage . 
However, this goes against the micro analysis c arr ied o ut, 
for example, by Jensen and Heckling ( 1976), who suggest that 
rational bondholders are aware o f the agency cost problems 
assoc iated with debt financi ng and will demand a higher rate 
o f return . Barnea, Haugen and Senbet f ound that 
in the same way as tax subsidy 'grosses up ' interest 
rates, agency costs ' gross them d own ' . . . and corpora-
tion s are enticed t o inc rease their supply o f debt only 
if they are compensated for the associated agency cos t 
disadvantage ( 198 la , p .579). 
Fo r any given firm, a reduction in the average a genc y 
cos t function f o r a g iven e is beneficial because it in-
c reases its "finan c ier surplus " , as it is c a lled by Barnea , 
Haugen and Senbet. This can be seen in Figure 3. 12. If AACD 
shifts t o A'A' C'D ', t he financier surplus is increased f r om 
PQRS to PTUV . 
The adoption of any solution to agency problems , if 
learned by all firms quickly, will reduce the interest rate . 
As Barnea, Haugen and Senbet argue, the dec isi on whether t o 
adopt it o r not will depend o n ho w rap idly the o ther firms 
will be able t o do the same . 
Since total agency costs for small firms are compo sed of 
debt as well as equity, and since in our analysis we incorpo-
rated the equity costs o n the demand side, we c an say that 
the burden o f the agency costs is shared by both part ies, 
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i . e., equity, and bondholders . 
Another implication of the preceding analysis is that 
due to high agency costs and high flotation costs, small 
firms face higher costs for debt and equity than large firms . 
This might lead them to forego projects that would have a 
negative NPV calculated with their cost of capital rates , but 
which would have a positive NPV for large corporations . 
In summary, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet specified an equi-
librium in which, among other things, capital structure af -
fects market value, and where the observable spread between 
yields on taxable and non - taxable bonds is explained . Our 
analysis takes as a point o f departure the research by these 
authors. In addition, we have a demand curve that is deter-
mined, not only by tax avoidance factors , but also by the 
effects of equity agency costs on the demand for debt. By 
separating the market according to size , this analysis suc -
ceeds in being able to explain the differences in the yield 
on securities of corporations of different sizes. The modi-
f ications of the analysis also show that the differential 
agency cost for the marginal unit of debt, which is deter-
mined in equilibrium 0* , is different for la rge corporations 
and small corporations . 
This analysis is also an extension of Hiller's analysis . 
In Hiller's analysis, the interest rate differential between 
taxable and tax-exempt bonds in the final equilibrium re -
flects exactly the tax advantage of debt financing at the 
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corporate level with personal tax burden. But obviously 
there are other factors that have to be taken into account by 
value maximizing firms when they are optimizing their capital 
structures . Moreover, it is likely that these factors affect 
the aggregate debt market and the equilibrium interest rates. 
The incorporation of the most significant of these factors 
was the purpose of the preceding analysis. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL KVIDKNCK AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Empirical Evidence 
l.Yield differential : taxable vs . tax-exempt securities 
The empirical evidence presented in this part deals wi th 
the testi~g of the different theories that try to explain the 
differential rate between taxable a nd t ax - exempt debt securi-
ties . The purpose of this literature r eview is t o find out 
if, in fact, there is empirical evidenc e that supports our 
\ 
theoretical conclusion that the equilibrium marginal tax rate 
is less than the corporate tax rate . This result is implied 
in the mo del analyzed in the previ ous c hapters, where debt 
agenc y costs are po sitive and signific a n t . There are mainly 
three theories that analyze this phenomenon . 
The Hiller Hodel (1977) assumes complete markets and no 
taxes o n inco me fro m equity and conclud es that the marginal 
tax rate at wo rk in the relative pric i ng o f taxab le and tax-
exempt debt o r equity is likely t o be the corporate tax rate 
because equilibrium must be achieved across all securities . 
The equality of the marginal tax rate with the corporate tax 
rate only holds when leverage related c osts are zero , as 
shown by Kim (1982) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ( 198la) . 
In the second theory, an extensio n of Hiller's model, it 
is a rgued that the various leverage related costs are signif-
i c ant eno ugh to influence the costs o f c orpo rate borrowing. 
That is, if the leverage related c osts such as bankruptcy 
costs, loss of non-debt tax shields, and agency costs of debt 
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are taken into account and if it is assumed that there are no 
taxes on income from equity, it is possible to conclude that 
the marginal bondholders' tax rate is less than the corporate 
rate and that there is a positive net tax advantage to corpo-
rate debt financing. Under these circumstances the firm's 
optimal capital structure involves the tradeoff between the 
tax advantages of debt and the leverage related costs. 
The third theory is the institutional demand theory. It 
takes the ~axable rate as exogenously determined and deter-
mines the tax-exempt rate, which responds to the supply and 
demand. It is assumed that the supply of municipal debt is 
inelastic with respect to interest and that the marginal tax 
rate is determined by the demand . The major participants are 
banks, property insurance, and individuals to a lesser extent 
since few indlviduals are trying to shield income taxed at 
the corporate rate . Banks are the only investors who may 
deduct interest payments in debt obligations, and at the same 
time invest in tax-exempt. Property insurance can also arbi-
trage if they discount premiums and invest in tax-exempt. 
The arbitrage, of course, will depend on the magnitude of the 
leverage related costs and on the existing legal regulations . 
The implication of this theory is that the marginal tax 
bracket depends on the demand for tax-exempt securities on 
the part of banks and property insurance institutions. If 
they demand 100% of the issuance, the tax bracket would be 
the corporate one . If they demand less than 100%, the rate 
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on tax-exempt has to increase to induce lower tax bracket 
individuals to buy these securities and , consequently, the 
marginal tax rate will decrease. 
It is worth noting that most of the articles that will 
be mentioned in this section deal directly or indirectly with 
the importance of the leverage related costs and the determi-
nation of the marginal tax rate . None of them, however, deals 
with how these leverage related costs affect differently 
small and iarge corporations. Nevertheless, it is very rele-
vant for this paper to have evidence supporting the fact that 
agency costs are significant as a first step towards empiri-
cal support for our findings. It would be very interesting, 
of course, t o carry out an empirical study that concentrates 
on tracking down the firm size effect on the differential 
rates betwee~ large a nd small corporations ' debt securities, 
but this is left to future research . 
As is often the case with empirical r esear ch, there are 
mixed results in the testing of the above mentioned theories. 
Among the selected time series studies which search for 
evidence on the existence of leverage related costs, there is 
one article by Trzcinka (1982) that rejects the significance 
o f these costs. Based on his evidence, Trzcinka cannot 
rejec t the original Miller hypothesis that the marginal bond-
holders tax rate is equal to the corporate tax rate . He 
emphasizes, however , that asssuming that income from equity 
is not taxed has important implications for his results and 
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that if this assumption is dropped, his results may be signi-
ficantly altered. Kamma and Trzcinka (1984), on the other 
hand, find different results when they include more recent 
data for the old sampie (Trzcinka, 1982) and when they take 
into a ccount the structural changes that took place in those 
' yea rs. Kamma and Trzcinka found that Miller's equilibrium 
model was altered by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
and the rec ession that began that year. 
The E~onomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 eliminated person-
al tax rates above fifty percent and lowered taxes by in-
c reasing the number and timing of tax shields . This act 
undermines the incent ive of investors in high tax brackets t o 
demand equity of unlevered firms and diminishes the incentive 
of corporations to issue debt with the consequent tax advan-
tages , since they can use no n-debt tax shields as a substi-
tute. These events, together with the economic recession of 
1981-82, would have s o me effect on Hi ller's framework by 
affecting Hi ller's equilibrium . Inflation is a third factor 
considered by Kammma and Trzcinka that may affect the equi-
librium because it alters investors' portfolio decisions by 
affecting real after-tax rates. 
Kamma and Trzcinka developed a mode l whi c h is an ext en-
sion of Hiller's. They argue that marginal costs of leverage 
appear to have increased during the recession and that this 
would cause the supply furve to shift down ( since they use 
the same framewo rk , it is possible to refer to Figure 3 . 1 ), 
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lowering the marginal tax rates. If leverage related tax 
costs are large enough so as to affect marginal tax rate, the 
tax reform that lowered the maximum tax rate (lowered margi-
nal tax rates at every income level) also affected the equi-
librium marginal tax rate because it increased the amount of 
taxable bonds demanded at each taxable interest rate. The 
increase in tax shield will have as an effect the increase in 
the substitutes for tax exempt debt and, consequently, would 
increase tke elasticity of demand for corporate debt. If 
debt related costs are negligible, neither the tax reform nor 
inflation would affect the marginal tax rate. 
Implicatio ns of their model are that if leverage related 
costs are positive , the tax rate will decrease with the 
recession and with a tax fall but will inc rease with infla-
tion . Inflation will magnify any change resulting from lev-
erage related costs, but its net effect is unclear . 
Evidence supporting the negative relationship between 
tax law changes and the marginal tax rate, as stated by Kamma 
and Trzcinka, would provide evidence in favor of the rele-
vance of leverage related costs being positive. 
For the empirical tests , Kamma and Trzcinka use the same 
data used by Trzcinka in 1982 . They employ new issues month-
ly averages of yields with various ratings and maturities 
collected from Salomon Brothers . 
In this study, the marginal tax rate has fallen from 
Trzcinka 's previous estimate. For example , when utility bond 
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yields are used as independent variables in this random slope 
model, the implied marginal tax rate is about 36% . 
Buser and Hess ( 1983) and Skelton (1983) have indepen-
dently found results similar to the ones in the Kamma and 
Trzcinka study by using very different methods on the same 
data . Kamma and Trzcinka have f ound mixed evidence as to 
whether the structural c hanges in the marginal tax rate were 
temporary or permanent . 
With tespect to the evidence supporting a particular 
theo ry o f the marginal tax rate, Kamrna and Trzcinka favor the 
Hiller analysis with positi ve leverage related costs and 
reject the institutional demand theo ry . The results showed 
that at least for 1980 t o 1981 the leverage related costs 
were significant and were an impo r t ant determining factor o f 
the supply of corporate debt . 
Were it not for these costs, our results imply that 
there should have been a dramatic inc rease in the 
supply o f corporate debt in the yea r 1981 to 1982. 
The absence of any such increase l ends further credence 
to the extended version of the Hiller model ( Kamma and 
Trzcinka, 1984, p.21). 
The aforementioned study by Buser and Hess ( 1983) uses a 
longer time series of data and different and highly sophisti -
c ated econometric techniques . Their results are evidence in 
favor of the exi s tence of significant leverage related costs 
in the economy. Furthermore, they found that the average 
effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically sig-
nificant and positive. They argue that this equity tax rate, 
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together with the leverage related costs have important im-
pacts on the relation between taxable and tax-exempt bonds. 
This research casts some doubts on Trzinka's 1982 results. 
Skelton (1983) tries to confront Miller's (1977) theory 
with the institutional theory by using the institution of 
regulation Q. He does not consider debt related costs to be 
relevant. He believes that if banks behave as tax arbitra-
geurs, any outside or legal restriction on the banking system 
would offset the municipal bond market. His results lead him 
to support this hypothesis, s o he finds that banks do have a 
very strong influence on the yield differential between taxa-
ble and tax-exempt bonds and, therefore, on the marginal tax 
bracket at work across the short term bonds. When banks can 
easily arbitrage, taxable rates are lower than regulation Q. 
Skelton finds ·that the point estimate of the mean marginal 
tax bracket is very close to the corporate or bank tax rate. 
On the other hand, when banks find it difficult to arbitrage, 
taxab le interest rates exceed regulation Q and the point of 
estimate of the marginal tax bracket is significantly lower. 
Thus, he supports the institutional demand and rejects a 
strong interpretation of Miller's model. 
Another study that discusses the importance of leverage 
related costs but at the firm level and also has some impli-
cations with the determination of the marginal tax bracket is 
the one by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim ( 1984 ). Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim use a cross sectional firm specific data to test for 
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the existence of an optimal capital structure . They develop a 
theoretical model that takes into account all the advances in 
the theory of optimal capital structure. Then, they present 
the testable implications of the theory by using comparative 
statistics and simulations of the model . They examine the 
cross sectional variations in firms' leverage ratios to de-
tect their relation with 1) the through time volatility of a 
firm's earnings, 2) the relative amount of n~n-debt tax 
shields, and 3) the i ntensity of research and development and 
advertising expenditures. 
In their analysis , Bradley, Jarrell and Kim use a twenty 
years average debt to total value measure f o r 851 firms 
covering 25 two digit S I C industries. With this sample , the 
autho rs seek to minimize the effect of transient variations 
through time due t o business c ycles o r lagged adjustments by 
firms towards their target leverage ratios. They f o und that 
the average firm's leverage ratio was very much re l ated t o 
industry c lassification . 
If the tax shields are fully utilized at the end o f the 
perio d or if the costs of financial distress per dol l ar o f 
end o f perio d value of the firm are positive , the difference 
between the corporate tax rate and the personal tax rate 
(Tc-Tpb) is unambiguously p o sitive, and therefore Tc is grea-
ter than Tpb . This implies that firms will stop issuing debt 
while the marginal bondholders' Tpb is less than Tc , and the 
net tax advantage of debt is positive . If they additionally 
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assume that the personal tax rate on income from stock (Tps) 
is positive , the optimal leverage involves balancing the net 
tax advantage of debt against the leverage related costs. 
The comparative statics and the simulation of the model 
provide the following testable implications : 1 ) The debt 
ratio is inversely related to the c o sts of financial dis-
tress , which include banking costs and the agency c o sts of 
debt. 2 ) The debt ratio is negatively relat~d to the levels 
o f non-deb\ tax shields. 3 ) The debt ratio is inversely 
related to the variability o f firm value if the costs of 
financial distress are significant. 
The empiri c al r e sults, which aim , among o ther things, at 
throwing some light o n the economic s ourc es o f these strong 
industry influenc es o n firm leverage ratios, show that the 
vo latility o f ·firm earnings is an important inverse determi-
nant o f firm leverage . I t helps explain both inter and 
i ntra-industry variations in firm leverage ratio. The i nten-
sity o f research and development and of advertising expendi-
tures is also related inversely to leverage. Both of these 
results are c onsistent with the formal balancing model of 
optimal leverage, in that the costs o f financial distress are 
relevant. They also find a direct relation between firm 
leverage and the relative amount of non-debt tax shields. 
This supports the the idea that non-debt tax shields serve 
for the security o f the firms assets , with more securable 
assets leading to higher leverage ratios. But these results 
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reject the theory that focuses on the substitutability 
between non-debt and debt tax shields. 
Wayne H. Mikkelson (1984) has some criticisms, particu-
larly to the way in which Br adley, Jarrell and Kim try t o 
group all debt agency costs into the cost of financial dis-
tress, whicb arise in their model only when the firm defaults 
on the senior (debt ) c laims. Mikkelson argues that even 
though a positive probability of default is ~ necessary 
condition ~or the existing security holders o f the firm to 
incur agency costs of debt financing, it is unclear whether 
agency costs of debt depend on variability of firm value, as 
predicted by the model. The mode l and simulations capture 
only costs that are directly related to default, but do not 
necessarily capture all the costs that generally are classi-
fied as agency costs o f debt financing, and this fact is 
inconsistent with some of the testable implic ations of the 
model. Mikkelson also c riti c izes the fact that many studies 
take leverage ratios as the only characteristic that differ-
entiates firms' claims structures . By doing this, they may 
miss the relevant variation in actual cl aims structures that 
is due to taxes, default related costs, incentive relat e d and 
contracting costs, and info rmational asymmetry costs. These 
studies, which focus on leverage ratios, should study alter-
native and mor e detailed characteristics of firms' claims 
structures. 
In summary, the articles discussed in this section 
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generally support the conclusion that debt related costs are 
relevant and affect the marginal tax bracket inversely. 
2. Equity differences between large and small corporations 
In this part, empirical evidence dealing with the rela-
. 
tionship between the return and the total market value of 
common stock is reviewed. Banz (1981) found that, on the 
average, smaller firms have higher risk adju~ted returns than 
larger fir~s, even though this difference has not been very 
stable through time. According to his findings, this size 
effect has been in existence for at least forty years. He 
argues that it is not known whether size itself is responsi-
ble for this phenomenon or whether size i s just a proxy for 
one or more true unknown factors correlated with size. 
As Reinganum and Smith (1983) have said: 
The findings suggest that even if there were no 
advantage of large size in the product market (equal 
rates of operating profits), large firms would still 
have a substantial capital-raising advantage over small 
firms. This advantage is unrelated to the widely re-
cognized flotation cost economies. Even after control-
ling for nondiversifiable risk using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPH), investors stil demonstrate a 
statistically significant and economically important 
preference for the securities of large firms. Investors 
apparently place a premium on large firms which is not 
attributable to large firms' observed lower risk as 
captured by widely used measures of nondiversifiable 
risk (beta risk) (p.213) . 
Many studies stimulated by Banz' ( 1981) findings have 
been published. They either try to examine the empirical 
evidence using different methods and techniques or they try 
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to give explanations to this empirical phenomenon. 
Among the studies that try to explain the results there 
are the ones that find high correlation between E/ P effect 
and firm size effect. Their goal is to control f o r one of 
the effects and test for the significance of the other one. 
Different authors have arrived at different conclusions by 
this method . Basu ( 1977), for example, finds that portfolios 
characterized by high E/ P ratios sho w higher .absolute and 
risk adjusted rates of return than p ortfolios f o rmed of 
randomly selected securities. Basu ( 1983 ) reexamines his 
earlier study and finds that the size effect virtually disap-
pears when returns are controlled for differences in risk and 
E/ P ratios. He dutects a high interaction between the two 
effects since the magnitude of risk adjusted returns is 
largest f o r small firms with high E/ P ratios. This result 
contradicts Reinganum ( 1981 ). Reinganum found that a st r ong 
firm size effec t exists, even after controlling returns f o r 
any E/ P effect, and f o und no E/ P effect when the contro l 
variables were reversed. It foll ows from Reinganum's study 
that firm size effect largely subsumes the E/ P effect . Ho a nd 
Stoll ( 1981) support Reinganum's conclusions. Their evidence 
indicates that the set of factors that c ause the abnormal 
returns is muc h more closely associated with firm size than 
with E/ P ratios. Even with these mixed results, it has been 
widely recognized that there is a small size effect indepen-
dent o f the earnings to price ratio. This recognitio n has 
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lead to the search f o r facto rs such as measurement o r statis-
tical e rro rs that would explain this size effect. There are 
a var iety of plausible hypo theses that try t o explain this 
anomaly. 
Some authors have tried t o test f o r the measurement and 
statistical testing problems by analyzing the effect o f an 
alternative method that takes into account the differences in 
trading frequency between large and small ftrms' stock. 
Others ana~yze the impact of a change in the portfolio hold-
ing strategy on the return of s mall firms. Finally, there 
are articles that scrutinize the sensitivity of the differen-
tial returns to the length o f the holding perio d. 
Roll (1981) for example, analyzes the effect that the 
trading frequency would have on the differential returns 
between small° and large corporations. He concludes that be-
cause small firms' stock is traded less frequently, r isk 
measures obtained from short interval returns data understate 
the actual risk from holding a small firm portfolio. The 
reason for this is that the low trading frequency causes this 
portfolio to have a higher autocorrelation of returns, which 
is completely spurious. The l arge r the average time between 
trades the higher the induced autocorrelation in the given 
portfolio. This autocorrelation results in a downward biased 
measure of porfolio risk, and with it a corresponding overes-
timate of '' risk adjusted" average retu rns. Reinganum ( 1982 ) 
investigates this aspect, constructing portfolios grouped by 
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size and estimating the betas using OLS and the aggregate 
coefficient method proposed by Dimson (1979). He finds that 
the average returns for small firms exceed those for large 
firms by more than thirty percent on an annual basis. Using 
Dimson's estimator, the difference in the estimated betas of 
large and small firms is about 0.7. This corrected measure-
ment of risk cannot explain the more than 30% difference in 
returns . This misassessment of risk analyzed by Roll (1981) 
and ReingaRum {1982) cannot explain the magnitude of the 
differential between small and large firms. 
Roll ( 1983b ) and Blume and Stanbaugh ( 1983 ) t r y t o 
demonstrate the sensitivity of security returns to the port-
folio strategy used . Researchers often use arithmetic o r 
rebalanced po rtfoli o returns, mainly because they are easy to 
compute. But . the buy and hold strategy is the one that best 
reflects investment experience. The sensitivity o f the re-
turns to the portfolio strategy arises because common stock 
data have serial dependence . Using the buy and hold strategy 
for the American and New York Stock Exc hange listed stock, 
Roll f ound that small firm premium was 7 . 5% per annum from 
1963 t o 1981 . With the same data, rebalanced and arithmetic 
methods produce an annual return difference of 14%. The 
annual difference in returns between the smallest and largest 
size quintiles (deciles) is about 34% ( 49.1% ) using the 
rebalanced and arithmetic methods but only about 17% (22 . 8%) 
using the buy and hold method. 
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Roll (1983b) argues that using the buy and hold method, 
the small firm effect is marginally significant. The results 
show how different portfolio strategies affect the magnitude 
of the size effect. Based on this evidence, both Roll and 
Blume and Stambaugh question the empirical relevance of this 
anomaly . 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) are among the researchers who 
analyze how the length of the investment horizon seems to be 
also relevant in terms of arriving at different results. 
They argue that whether investors can earn abnor mal returns 
net of transaction c osts by choosing small firms ' stock, 
depends o n the length of the investment horizon . They f o und 
that for a length as short as one month, the mean abnormal 
returns net o f transaction costs for small firms a r e nega-
tive . As the length of the investment horizon increases ( to 
a year o r s o) these abnormal returns become positive . 
Keim ( 1983) and Brown, Kleidon and Marsh ( 1983 ) contrib-
buted to the investigation of the size effect by providing 
new evidence on its time series behavior. They found that 
the magnitude and size of that relation a r e not constant 
between 1967 and 1969. They report a reversal of the size 
anomalies f o r certain years. Their most striking finding, 
however was that the size effect is seasonal. Keim finds 
that almost fifty percent of the average magnitude of the 
size effect over the period from 1963 to 1979 is attributable 
to January abnormal returns. He further discovers that fifty 
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percent of the January premium is due to returns during the 
first week of trading in the year . When this January effect 
was detected, another wave of articles (e. g., Roll, 1983a; 
Reinganum and Smith, 1983; Constantinides, 1984) was written 
attempting to explain it. The following hypothesis was for-
mulated : Some investors sell stock at the end of the c alendar 
year to obtain short term capital losses f o r inco me tax 
purposes, and this behavior will put a downward pressure on 
the price of securities prior to the end of the year . It 
follows that this event will superficially increase the price 
of stocks during the first week of the following year. This 
hypothesis has been tested and, in mo st cases, rejected. 
Costantinides ( 1984 ), for example, builds a theoretical model 
using the existing distinction in the tax system between 
short term and long term tax rates , and he finds that the 
hypothesis would be accepted only if an assumption is made 
where the investors are irrational o r ignorant. He argues 
that the optimal tax trading on medium and high variance 
stock, typical o f small firms has benef its that outweigh even 
high transaction costs. He concludes that tax trading is not 
able to explain the small firm effect but predicts a seasonal 
pattern in trading volume which should c ause a seasonal 
pattern in the stock prices, but not the January anomaly. 
As can be expected, many researchers have tried t o 
explain the size effect thro ugh transaction costs dif feren-
tials. Schultz (1983) tried unsuccessfully to track down any 
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possibility of seasonality in these transaction costs that 
would explain the January effect. Stoll and Whaley ( 1983 ) , 
Schultz ( 1983 ) and Roll (1983a ) all agree that transaction 
cost differences f or small and large corpo rations are signif -
icant. They note that sma l l firms' stock tends to have lower 
prices and higher bid-ask spreads but that they cannot fully 
explain the abnormal average risk-adjusted returns of small 
corporations. 
Schulnz ( 1983 ) finds that the portfolio of small firms 
earns risk adjusted exc ess returns after t ransaction costs of 
almost 31% for ho lding periods of twelve months. This p o r t-
f o lio earns statistic ally significant excess returns after 
transaction costs f o r h olding peri ods as short as one month , 
January included. 
Reinganum and Smith (1983) believe, nevertheless, that 
for individual traders arbitr aging away the gains t o small 
firms' portfolios involves signif icant losses. They argue 
that transaction costs t o mantain a well -diversified small 
firms portfolio as compared to a well diversified large firm 
po rtf olio , are much larger due to the f requenc y of delisting 
among small firms . 
Non-stati onarity in the risk measure was another attempt 
by Christ ie and Hertzel (1981) to explain the size effect. 
If the estimates assume that risk is constant over time, this 
understates the risk of levered stock whose value has de-
creased, since t he risk o f stock of a levered firm increases 
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as the stock value decreases. But this alternative hypothe-
sis does not take care of the size effect either. 
Klein and Bawa (1977) try to explain the difference in 
returns o f large and small corporations by arguing that lack 
of information about small firms leads to the higher returns 
demanded bi investors , due to the uncertainty about the true 
parameters of the return distribution. Of course, this is 
just a conjecture that happens to be consis~nt with empiri-
cal evidenc~. 
Other potential sources of the divergences in required 
returns are the various regulatory and institutional con-
straints on the capital market. As Reinganum and Smith 
(1983 ) have said, the "prudent man" rule and related state 
and federal legislati on prevent or inhibit the formation of 
small f irrns mutual fund shares and trustees investments in 
small firms . The effect of this regulation is to eliminate a 
l arge group of potential investors in small firm securities 
and it enhances discrimination against small firms. 
Summarizing, the search for an explanation of the fact 
that small firms earn on average higher risk adjusted returns 
than large firms has been unsuccessful. Many authors i nter-
pret these results as a rejection of the capital asset pri-
cing model as a well-specified model but not as evidence of 
an inefficient capital market . There have been s ome attempts 
to modify the CAPH to account for taxation, transaction 
costs, skewness preference and so forth, but they have failed 
117 
to unveil the missing factor fo r which size might be a proxy. 
One article dealing strict ly with CAPH related problems is Ho 
and Stoll's ( 1981). 
It is clear that an intense search for the economic and 
statistical causes of the high average returns to small firms 
have been, and will continue to be a phenomenon that stimu-
lates empirical and theoretical research. The results of 
this thesis indicate additional facto rs that might be con-
sidered in'explaining the small firm anomaly. Even though 
the model discussed in the paper offers a plausible hypothe-
sis that tries to explain the difference in returns for smal l 
and large corporations taking into account differences in 
transaction costs and equity related agency costs, it t oo 
fails to expl~in the January effect. 
As menti oned in Chapter Three, the economic implications 
of higher cost of equity capital for small corporations are 
important. It implies that small firms might be forced to 
reject some risky project because of a negative NPV, while 
the same pro ject has a positive NPV for a large corporation. 
By the same token, as noted by Reinganum and Smith (1983), a 
small firm could raise less capital per unit of productive 
capacity than an equally risky large firm. Another implica-
tion is that mergers with this cost differential are an 
attractive economic venture for small firms since it will 
reduce its equity cost of capital as a larger firm. 
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3.Cost of debt : differences for large and small firms 
The purpose of this section is to present the existing 
empirical evidence related to the yield differential in bonds 
and the differential cost o f debt funds other than b onds, 
i.e., bank loans, between large and small firms. 
Research that is directly applicable is scarce . In part 
this is due to the fact that our analysis is c arried out in 
risk adjusted (o r certainty equivalent) yields. 
Most ot the literature that analyzes yield differentials 
takes into account bond rating as one of the facto rs and this 
t reatment might subsume the size effect. Fo r example, Hersch-
man ( 1979) referred to small companies as B rated companies 
(a B rated bond is cons ide r ed t o be speculative). The high 
yield bo nds o f small companies are al so labeled junk bonds 
(a lso because ~f the speculative ratings o n the b onds) . In 
1978, these high yield bonds brought returns of betwen 10% 
and 13.5% at various times, compared t o 8% to 9% f o r AAA 
bonds (not risk adjusted). 
Among the determinants o f systematic volatility o f cor-
p orate bonds , HcEnally and Ferri ( 198 2) mention duration, 
coupon maturity, agency rating, call pro spect, quantity o ut-
standing, and sinking fund intensity. Some o f their conclu-
si ons about the explanatory variables are: first, t hat except 
when volatility is defined with respec t t o the pric e changes 
o f the long term default-free assets of corporate b onds, the 
betas are inversely related to the quality of the issue; and 
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second that bond outstanding in larger quantities and issues 
with strong sinking funds tend to have lower betas. 
In a separate study, Ferri (1978) empirically examined 
the determinants of bond yield. He mentions, in addition to 
the factors noted above, the risk of default and the outstan-
ding supply of each type of bond . If two bonds differ in 
risk of default the r iskier bond would have a higher yield 
since the bond looses earning power and marketability. 
The p6int is that the bonds of small corporations, which 
generally are rated B and where the quantity issue is direct -
ly related to the size of the corpo ration, usually have a 
higher beta, and therefore a higher return . The problem here 
is to detect what fraction of rate differential is accounted 
for by beta and if there is a fraction of this rate diff eren-
tial accounted for by agency costs. Another possibility is 
that agenc y costs might be confused with risk and are accoun-
ted for in the beta. Furthermore, part of risk o f default, 
which is highly related to bankruptcy agency costs, is not 
accounted f o r in beta, which is systematic risk. Therefore, 
this risk of default is helpful in explaining the rate dif-
ferential between certainty equivalent returns of large and 
small corpo rations . 
Fischer (1959) asserts: 
Economists have long agreed that the rate of inter-
est on a loan depends on the risks the lender incurs. 
But how lenders estimate these risks has been left 
largely to conjecture (p.217) . 
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He believes that the risk premium depends on the risk of 
default and on the marketability of the bond. The risk of 
default in Fischer's study is a function of the coefficient 
o f variation o f the firm's net income over the last 9 years 
(after all charges and taxes), the period of time the firm 
. 
has been functioning without defaulting to the creditors, and 
the ratio of the market value o f the firm's equity t o the par 
value of the firm's debt. The marketability .was measured by 
one variable, i . e. , the market value of all publically traded 
bonds the firm had outstanding. This measure of marketabili-
ty was chosen because it seems to lead t o better predictions 
of risk premiums, whi c h was the independent variable of the 
regression. Fischer f ound that large corporations are able 
t o borrow at a l ower c ost than small corporations. This is 
the article that most precisely studies the characteristics 
with which we are conc erned and Fisc her's results are con-
sistent with our theoretical conclusions, namely, that after 
adjusting for risk, the rate on small corporations is higher 
than the rate for large corporations. 
Dreman (1981 ) undertook a research program on the sub -
ject of why securities o f small firms did s o well, t o find 
out how sound Banz' (1981) study is, which c oncludes that the 
lowest 20% of stock by market value on the New York stock 
exchange has done better than other groups over an extended 
period of time . He found that small capitalization compa-
nies did well not because they prospered, as Banz had con-
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eluded, but because of precisely the opposite reason. They 
were in financial difficulties when they were part of the 
smallest capitalization group. Later on, a good number sur-
vived, accompanied by ·a dramatic increase in price. The main 
point he makes is that their findings show clearly that 
investors react more sharply to the financial difficulties o f 
small companies than to the financial difficulties of large 
ones . The fear of bankruptcy of severe operating problems 
drastically reduces their price. This is in agreement with 
the fact that , in general, agency costs of bankruptcy or 
liquidation are higher for small firms than for large ones. 
Cooley and Pullen ( 1979) have noted that most small 
businesses use commercial banks as their primary source of 
borrowed funds . They found that, in general, size o f the 
c redit line closely correlates to size o f the firm. Their 
study reveals small businesses as being closely tied to their 
commercial bankers . 
The banking system is subjected to continuous changes by 
technology, regulations, and competition. Huch (1 976) argues 
that .. Banks facing rising costs are moving to recover more of 
the expenses involved in services they offer to commer cial 
customers " (p.57) . She states that in some cases smaller 
firms may be the first to be hit . 
Banks are raising fees on some services and have down-
played those which are less profitable . Huch cites the Chase 
Manhattan Bank as an example. It recently moved out of the 
122 
venture capital business, which provides the seed money for 
new businesses, because it was not profitable enough . 
At the moment, some bank analysts contend that smaller 
companies would be squeezed the most by this practice since 
they do not have the bargaining p ower of the larger firms. 
It is the smaller firm that usually deals with only one bank 
which runs the risk of being declassified as prime borrower. 
Although we believe that there is a yield differential 
after adju&ting for risk, Levenson (1962) does not support 
this idea. Levenson tries to analyze the 1946 business loan 
surveys of the Board o f Governors, which showed that when the 
size o f the bo rrower is held constant , the interest rate 
declines steadily with increasing size of the loan. He notes 
that this might be because of some costs which are fixed and 
do no t vary wfth the size of the loan. This implies that the 
cost per dol lar of l oan dec reases as the size of the loan 
increases, and s h ould be r eflected in higher interest c harges 
f o r smaller loans. The 1946 sur vey also ahows that when the 
size of the l o an is held constant , interest rates dec lined 
with increased size of b o rrower . The alternative explanation 
o ffered by Levenson to these empirica l observations is that 
this might be due to greater cost o f investigation and admi -
nistration or to greater risk ass ociated with lending t o 
small borrowers. Also, it may be due to price discrimination 
by size of borrower. He argues that these observations in 
the rate differential have lead people t o inf er that since 
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large borrowers pay lower rates than small ones, small bor-
rowers are discriminated against in the business loan market. 
His study is concerned with a statistical estimate of the 
different expense rates incurred by banks in making small and 
large business loans. 
Levenson calculated the variation in current operation 
expenses among a gro up o f banks assoc iated with making l o ans 
to small and large businesses. He tried t o h o ld other sig-
nificant fqct ors c onstant through statistical procedures. He 
f ound that if interest rates are adjusted f o r risk , the 
remaining differentia l is justified by cost differenc es . He 
conc ludes from his results that dis c rimination against smal l 
bo rrowers was no t being practic ed. He believes that cost 
differenc es are an i mpo rtant expl anation o f t he rate d iffer-
enc es c harged ·at comme r c ial banks i n l oans to s mall as o p -
p osed t o large businesses. 
Fo r a pro per c omparison with our results, it would be 
necc essary t o analyze what the compo s i ti on of these adminis -
trative costs is bec ause monitoring, i nfo rmational asymmetry , 
and other debt related agency costs might be inc l uded in 
them . In that case, the resul t s would still be consistent 
with the existenc e o f a rate differential betwee n small and 
large c orporations, even after adjusting f o r risk . 
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4.The relationshi:Q between leverage and f11:m ~ 
The empirical evidence pertaining to the relationship 
between firm size and the degree of leverage employed by the 
firm, would be more meaningful if we investigated intra-
industr y comparisons, since there are definite differences 
among industries . Among manufacturing firms , fo r instance, 
Federal Trade Commi sion data indicate a tendency f o r smaller 
firms to utilize larger proportions of debt, . as noted by 
Brigham and Smith (1967) . Table 4 . 1 is reproduced from 
Walker and Petty ( 1978) and updated t o include the years 
1973- 1980 . As noted by Brigham and Smith, the data provided 
by the FTC reveal that long term debt increased with firm 
size, and that this increase is greatly offset by a decrease 
in the use of trade c redit. 
Gupta (1969), in a study where h e seeks to analyze the 
financial ratio s with respect t o three exogenous variab l es , 
industry, size and growth, also finds that the debt to t otal 
as sets ratio is negatively r elated t o size o f the c o rpo ra -
ti on. He further found that the bank loans to total assets 
ratio i s invariably higher in the smaller sized cor~orations . 
With respect to the rnaturi~y of the debt structure, he notes 
that it is likely t o be shorter for the small corpo rat ions 
than for the large one s . In terms of financial rati os, he 
finds that, for small fi rms , the current liabilities turnover 
is low a nd t he c urrent liabilities to total debt ratio is 
high. 
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TABLE 4 .1 
Leverage Position of S..11 and Larae Companies--Percentage 
1967-1980 a 
Small Firms Large Firms 
------------------ ------------------
Year Debt Equity Debt Equity 
------------------------------------------------------------
1967 45.5 54.5 40.2 59.6 
1966 ' 46.2 53.8 43.0 57.0 
1969 47.0 53.0 44.5 55.5 
1970 48.0 52.0 46.0 5-t . O 
1971 49.0 51. 0 46 . 0 54.0 
1972 50. 4 49.6 46.6 53.2 
1973 52.0 46.0 47 . 6 52.4 
1974 52.9 47.1 46.0 54.0 
1975 52.0 46.0 46.3 53 . 6 
1976 52 . 0 .(6 . 0 45 . 8 54.2 
1977 53.6 46.4 46.3 53.7 
1978 55.2 .(4. 6 47 . 0 53.0 
1979 55.5 44.5 48 . 6 51. 4 
1980 54.8 45 .2 50 . 0 50.0 
------------------------------------------------------------
a : Federa l Trade Commission(1967-1980 > 
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In this analysis, he revealed the f o llowing pattern in 
summarizing the relationship of the various financial varia-
bles with respect to corporate size and growth rate. Activity 
ratios and leverage ratios were f ound to be inversely related 
to the size of the firm but are directly related to its 
growth rate . 
This implies that when all small sized corporations are 
also characterized by a high growth rate , the positive effect 
of the sma}l size of the activity and leverage ratio s is 
reinf orced by the posit ive effec t of a high growth rate on 
these two ratios. Consequently, small sized corporations 
with a very high growth rate tend to have very high a ctivity 
and leverage ratios. Second, when we have the case of large 
corporations characterized by a high growth rate, the nega-
tive effect o r large size of activity and leverage ratios 
will tend to be o ffset by the positive effect of a hi gh 
growth rate with the result that the large sized corporations 
experiencing high growth tend t o have moderate activity and 
leverage ratios. Third, when the large corporati ons are 
associated wi t h a l o w growth rate , the negative effect o f 
size in their activity and leverage ratios is reinfo r ced by 
the negative effect of the l o w growth rate and they may have 
low a ctivity and leverage ratios. These results also support 
our findings of the relationship between leverage and the 
rate o f growth with size. 
In a separate study, Walker and Petty (1978) gathered 
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random sample s of both small and large manufacturing 
businesses. For their study, Walker and Petty classified 
firms as small if they had less than $5 million in total 
assets. They used the compustat data base f o r sampling large 
companies. The only constraint on the random selection proc-
ess was to have similarity o f industries f o r large and s mall 
firms. They f ound that the capital str ucture for small firms 
is mo re debt o riented with a greater tendency f o r using short 
term c redit . They r emark that their sample may have a bias 
in the sense that the companies analyzed we re typical ly small 
firms with significan t growth potent i al . 
The empirical evidence presented a bove seems t o support 
o ur r esults with respect t o the l evel of debt of small corpo-
rat ions versus large ones . The fact that small corpo rat i ons 
tend to use sho rt term debt more than thei r large counter-
parts is con s i stent with s mall , growing corporations trying 
to minimize the agency costs related t o t he pos s i bility of 
forgoing a profitable investment . These firms have a large 
percentage of their value represented by growth oppo rtuni -
ties. If the debt matures before the investment decision i s 
made , debtholders can undertake the investment if the revenue 
is greater t han the out lay. In this sense , the agency costs 
arising from forgoing profitable investment oppo rtunities 
wo uld be zero. 
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B. Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis has contributed to the insights from pre-
vious research o n capital structure and yield differentials . 
By analyzing the dif fe~ent effects of agency costs on large 
and small debt markets , the thesis extends the earlier work 
of Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981a ) and Miller (1977). 
According to our analysis, the rate differential between 
the equity of large and small corporations is explained using 
equity agency costs, flotation costs and the asymmetry of 
information costs related to equity. For the small firm 
sector, the debt related asymmetry of information costs t o-
gether with all the debt agency costs were incorporated in 
the supply curve following Barnea, Haugen and Senbet's 
approach. 
The analysis carried out in Chapter Two lead us to 
conclude that when taking all the debt-related agency costs 
together, the relative agency costs would be greater for 
small than for large firms at a given capital structure. 
In this modified framework , equilibrium occurs for each 
sector where their respective demand and supply curves inter-
sect . The resulting equilibrium interest rate is higher for 
the small firm sector . When each individual firm takes 
the market premia for agency costs based on the aggregate 
equilibrium into account, several interesting results emerge. 
The first is that an optimal capital structure exists f o r 
each firm. The second is that because of the differences in 
129 
equilibrium agency cost premia f o r large and small firms, 
small firms are more highly levered than large firms. The 
third is that in the partial general equilibrium framework, 
the debt agency costs are borne by the bondholders ( this 
applies to both large and small firm sectors) and the equity 
agency costs ( whi ch are only relevant for small firms) are 
borne by the outside equity holders as well as ~he 
bondholders. 
l 
The empirical evid~nce presented in Section A of this 
Chapter seems to support most of the results of Chapter 
Three. The empirical evidence with respect to debt related 
agency costs appears to bear most directly o n the issues 
raised in this thesis. Among the available evidence suppor -
ting the relev.ance o f debt related agency costs in general, 
on e can mention among others Kamrna and Trzcinka ( 1984), Buser 
and Hess ( 1983) a nd Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984). In 
particular, Altman ( 1984) has added to the empiri c al support 
of the relevance o f bankruptcy agency costs by estimating 
both direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy . Furthermo re , 
Castanias ( 1983) has found that the correlati on coefficient 
between total assets and failure rate is negative and signif-
i c ant. He f o und that the probability of failure is higher 
for those lines of business in whi ch firms are smaller on the 
average, supporting the contention that bankruptcy agency 
costs are highe r f o r small firms than f o r large ones. 
There have been mo re theo retical than empirical studies 
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concerning the relevance of the other debt agency costs, 
i.e., the incentive to forego profitable investments, the 
risk incentive associated with leverage and the liquidation 
agency costs. Further empirical evidence directly concerning 
the r elevance of these agency costs and in particular the 
differential effect that they have in small and large firms 
wo uld be a valuable contribution in this area of capital 
structure and rate differential among different securities 
which is the primary focus of the present analysis. 
There have been very few attempts to empirically test 
the relevance of the equity agency costs analyzed in Chapter 
Two. Nevertheless , the attitude of investors towards small 
corpora~ions with an owner-manager can best be described by 
Rader, a Wall .Street analyst who is a recognized specialist 
in small companies. Herschman (1977) quotes Rader as saying : 
I shy away from companies in which the entrepreneur-
founder is still the sole decision -make r with his fin-
ger on the trigger. I now insist on companies in which 
the baton for managing the business has passed f rorn the 
entrepreneur to a professional management team, because 
I have found that the bulk of entrepeneurs are not able 
to cope when their business gets large ( p . 95) . 
Further empirical research in this area should focus on 
the relevance of these agency costs and on the testing of 
whether they will be able to explain the existing yield 
differential between stock of large and small corporations . 
Another study that has indirectly provided some empiri-
cal support to the equity agency costs is the one by Cooley 
and Edwards (1982). They examined empirically whether mana-
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gerial compensation of small firm executives depends on the 
degree of executive ownership . Their results supported the 
hypothesis that smal l business chief executive officers who 
are sole o r maj o r ity owners receive larger compensation than 
those with minority or no ownership. They also found that 
management salaries are a larger percentage of t o tal assets 
for smaller firms than f o r larger firms. The ownership re-
l ated salary increments appeared financially .significant in 
all the models they used. He gave a tax-reductio n explana-
tion to this empirical results but this is just a conjecture , 
and it might as well be a component o f the equity agency cost 
in the form of excessive pecuniary benefits o r a combination 
o f these two conjectures . 
In conclusion, further research is called f o r in o rder 
to test direct~y s ome o f the theoret i ca l implications presen -
ted in this thesis. Hore empirica l suppo rt would increase 
the credibility of the hypotheses presented in the analysis, 
even though our results appear t o be consistent with the 
existing empirical evidence. 
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